"...
physical elimination has to be prepared"
The
Destruction of the GDR Section
The investigation of the
"enemy object" offered the possibility of switching to a harder line
and striking a harsh blow in December 1980 and especially in March 1981: in all,
eight members and supporters of the GDR Section were arrested and judicial
inquests were initiated against them for offenses under Section 106 of the
(GDR)* penal code ("subversive agitation against the state"); judicial
inquests were also initiated against two other people who were not arrested.
(cf. Informationen der Hauptabteilung IX/2
<Information of Main Department IX/2>* dated November 5, 1981, BStU, ZA,
AU 2409/83, vol. 7, pages 189f).
The two leading activists of
the GDR Section - one of whom being a qualified mathematician, the other one an
engine fitter and piquantly employed in that function with the printing plant of
(the SED central organ) NEUES DEUTSCHLAND - were sentenced to the maximum
penalty of eight years’ imprisonment each. The well known attorney at law,
Wolfgang Vogel, too, was interested in defending them as a counsel.
One of the two persons chiefly
responsible served his sentence at Brandenburg, the other one at Bautzen. While
in prison, both of them applied for moving to the FRG but they were deported to
the West after five and a half years’ imprisonment only.
The sequence of apprehensions
resulted from the view to starting with the supposed „weakest link“, i.e.
the more wavering supporters. The StaSi supposed that their statements would
result in sufficient incriminating material for apprehending the leading KPD
activists. By apprehensions the StaSi were capable of further reconstructing the
GDR Section’s activities. In the dwelling of one person arrested, an encoded
list of 150 names was found; within short time, the StaSi decoded 36 of these
persons 24 of whom resulted in being „unofficial positions“ of the MfS.
The GDR Section’s supporters
and sympathizers who could not be convicted of offences under criminal law were
put under pressure by temporarily „bringing into contact“ („questioning
about a matter“). Should they, under such circumstances, incriminate one
another, so the MfS would have the required evidence. Should they, however,
prefer to say nothing, the StaSi could not detain them but effectively bring
them into discredit in the eyes of their fellow-comrades especially by quickly
releasing them. No matter how, the MfS took all advantages (cf. Massnahmeplan der Abteilung IX der BV Berlin zur Vorbereitung und Durchführung
der am 29.9.81 geplanten strafprozessualen Pruefungsbedingungen vom 26.8.81
<The Berlin District Administration’s Department IX’s Plan of measures
dated August 26, 1981 for preparing and executing the examination conditions for
criminal procedures projected as from September 29, 1981>, BStU, ZA, AU
2409/83, vol. 7, pages 8-10).
The detained persons’ next
relatives, too, were „invited“ in order to be interrogated, and this in many
cases under a legend.
In April 1981, a female
relative of an arrested male attempted to commit suicide after the StaSi had
clearly demonstrated her their „omniscience“ and „omnipotence“ in the
course of interrogating her (cf. BStU, ZA, AOP, 634/85, vol. 1, pages 257-260).
Divorce was suggested to my wife, and the prospect of forced
adoption of our common child was hold out to her by explaining her that our
family did not guarantee the child’s education 22in the „sense of the GDR
socialism“. It was pointed out that the child (3 years old) was observed, too,
with respect to his development.
Means of questioning were not
only threatening remarks such as „not
under 10 years of clink“ or: „We
are able to forcedly divorce you“, but also open death threats: „Should
you be once more near the Albanian Embassy you must have in mind that we will be
present all over the place. And how quickly can a traffic accident happen!“
(cf. notes „Furcht und Elend der Stasi“ - Die Lehren der Stasiverhöre <„The
StaSi’s dread and wretchedness“ - The lessons from the interrogations by the
StaSi>.)
That were, however, not only
mere threats made for intimidation. In Poland, for instance, many comrades of
the illegal Communist Party were murdered or assassinated by the organs of
security. That has been evidenced sufficiently. In the GDR, the StaSi maintained
a special unit of about 300 people who were at disposal in order to commit
murders and acts of terrorism.
Although this unit was intended for an operation in the West (in the so called „Spannungsfall“
<case of conflict>), the unit could be activated for special tasks in the
GDR. A member of the unit said that they have been trained in „multiple variants“ of the way how a person could be killed.
This special unit was not only specialized in perfectly executing faked
motor-vehicle accidents but disposed, too, of all knowledge of faking suicides
out of violent crimes (cf. the book „Stasi
und kein Ende. Die Personen und Fakten“ <StaSi and no end. The persons
and facts>, Ullstein-Buch N° 34773 <1991>, pages 213-215).
Provided unofficial
collaborators (IM), too, were incriminated by name by statements of persons
taken into custody, the State Security Service (StaSi) ensured that such an IM
was „removed“ from the GDR Section in the discreetest possible manner.
On principle, the StaSi
arrested such persons who could be convicted of offences punishable under
criminal law and who not were IM.
In spring time of 1981, the
MfS started large-scale travelling obstructions and searches as supporting
measures of the arrests. In all, 357 West German comrades of the KPD were not
allowed to enter the country (according to MfS statements, 65 officials, 14
instructors, 16 couriers and 262 further activists of the Party were concerned).
How well the Mielke Ministry
(MfS) was informed was demonstrated when in the MfS the question was considered
whether the presence of an IM at the 5th Party Congress of the KPD in Winter
1983 was useful or not. Obviously, they came to the conclusion that the
resolutions of the Party’s congress anyway would be known and that it would be
disadvantageous if the presence of a delegate of the Section allowed the KPD to
claim ist own presence in the GDR. Besides, the MfS got even knowledge of the
contents of the speeches of some delegates as the congress was approaching with
the aid of an unofficial collaborator (cf. Abschrift
eines Antrages bzw. Stellungnahme eines Funktionaers der KPD zum bevorstehenden
Parteitag, welche der IM einsehen konnte, vom 26.6.1983 <copy dated June
26th, 1983 of a KPD official’s proposal or statement for the approaching Party
Congress the IM was able to inspect>, BStU, ZA, AOPK 8236/87, pages 253-262).
The
Public Outcries - the KPD’s Activities of Solidarity
After the massive wave of
arrests in the GDR, the KPD analysed ist causes. Beside the insufficiently
conspiratorial activities of the Section’s comrades, reference was made to the
supporting a22ctivities by the DKP (German Communist Party <at that time the
West German party of the modern revisionists>) which worked as the MfS’
prolonged tentacle (cf. Bericht der AG
XXII der BV Berlin vom 22.12.83 zum Treffen mit dem Inoffiziellen Mitarbeiter
der Abwehr mit Feindberührung <IMB> „Trabant“ <The Berlin
District Administration’s Team XXII’s Report dated December 22nd, 1983 on
the meeting with the Unofficial Collaborator of the Counter-Intelligence with
Enemy Contact <IMB> „Trabant“>, BStU, ZA, Neiber 91, pages
183-191).
Many activities all over the
Federal Republic of Germany were started for the imprisoned communists in the
GDR to be freed. Activists of the Party (KPD) occupied the Bonn offices of the
ADN (General German News Service <of the GDR>) (in October 1981), tried to
block crossing points of the Autobahn (motorway) at the frontier or chained
themselves to the building of the Permanent Representation of the GDR at Bonn
(in July 1982). In front of the border guard in the Bornholm Street, five
comrades went on a four-day hunger strike (in December 1981). Twice, comrades
tried to present petitions (with collected signatures) against the arrests to
GDR organs (in October and December 1981). Six times (between December 1981 and
May 1982), pamphlets were spread from West Berlin to the Eastern half of the
city with the aid of balloons and thus the arrests publicized (cf. Information
230/82 ueber erneute Hetzschriften-Ballonaktionen von Berlin <West> aus,
o.D. <Information 230/82 about new smear-script balloon actions from
Berlin <West>, not dated>, BStU, ZA, Neiber 90, pages 155 f).
West German communists
ventured into „the lion’s den“, too. In a totally surprising manner for
the GDR authorities, four of these communists entered East Berlin, coming from
West Berlin, and chained themselves in Alexander Place (in November 1981), far
from that place, another one threw leaflets down from the balustrade of the
„Centrum“ department store at the same time (cf. Abschlussbericht der Abteilung XXII/8 zum OV „Sektion“ vom
30.03.1989 <The Department XXII/8’s Final Report on „Section“
Operative Dossier dated March 30th, 1989>; BStU, ZA, AOP 2796/89, vol. 1,
pages 216-220).
Eventually, a West German half-brother of one of the
arrested comrades collected more or less 200 signatures for the release of the
arrested communists and entered the GDR in the morning of November 18th, 1982
without questioning, delivered the petition at the GDR Ministry’s reception
office and went back to the West without any problem (among the persons who had
given their signatures were Heinrich Boell <well known critical West German
author who had become a moral authority by his understanding for the motives of
the fighters of the so-called Red Army Fraction whilst the West German
authorities reacted to them in a very hysterical manner was held in great esteem
by the GDR mass media> and Heinrich Albertz <former Governing Mayor of
West Berlin held in great esteem there, too, who, in a very self-critical
manner, took the responsibility in 1967 after - on June 2nd, 1967 - the West
Berlin police, in the course of student protests against the West Berlin visit
of the Shah of Persia, had shot one of the students and who, some years later,
put him-self at disposal as a hostage of urban guerrilla fighters in order to
save the life of a politician captured by them for obtaining the release of
their imprisoned comrades - Boell and Albertz acted as convinced Christians and
did so by giving their signatures, too>) (cf. Report dated December 1st,
1982; further: AOPK „Springer“, BStU, ASt Frankfurt on Oder, AOPK Cottbus
1819/84).
The MfS tried to parry that
campaign in an effective and most discreet possible, too, manner. The comrades
who had chained themselves were arrested. Two days after having been arrested,
they were sentenced to imprisonment of six months and expelled from the GDR.
The MfS needed show less
consideration for the Section comrades, the remaining activists, however, should
not be able to start spectacular actions. („In spite of all consequence of our measures, any confrontation which
should result in spectacular actions of the ‘KPD’ or in other effects with a
high grade of publicity must be avoided“ - Neiber wrote this in
reproducing Mielke’s orders. Neiber’s letter dated December 3rd, 1982).
Studies
in Marxism-Leninism are Prohibited
Although many GDR Section’s
activists were arrested the Ministry believed it necessars to steel itself
against the undermining „bacillus“ called KPD in a special manner. Operative
personal checks with the code name „Igel“ (hedgehog) were introduced just
against four of the arrested comrades as the MfS’ Main Department VII,
competent for the prisons, feared that these prisoners were able to have a bad
influence on their co-prisoners by their „hostile views“. 4 MfS’
unofficial collaborators as well as 2 unofficial collaborators of the
plainclothes police (activity scope I) were brought into play in order to
prevent them from that.
One of the subversive
intentions of a prisoner was to study the texts of the classical authors of
Marxism-Leninism without being disturbed. The Ministry for State Security,
however, interdicted that, thus running into great argumentation difficulties
(cf. BStU, ZA, AOPK 427/85).
The MfS, however, did not
leave it at that but realized „subversion measures“, too, during the
imprisonment. „By aimed political
operative measures, the impression of co-prisoners of the former GDR Section’s
leader was deepened that the same was active for the MfS as a ‘stool pigeon of
the StaSi’. As a consequence, other prisoners are more and more distrustful
against him and shun him-“ (Zwischeneinschaetzung
der Abteilung XXII/3 zum OV „Sektion“ vom 3.1.86 <The Department
XXII/3’s Interim Assessment to the Operative Dossier „Section“ dated
January 3rd, 1986>, BStU, ZA, AOP 2796/89; Information
der Arbeitsgruppe XXII der BV Berlin vom 12.4.85 zur linksextremistischen
„KPD“, <The Berlin District Administration’s Team XXII’s
Information dated April 12th, 1985 on the extreme left „KPD“>, BStU, ZA,
Neiber 91, pages 73-75; Sachstandsbericht
der Abteilung VII der BV Brandenburg zur OPK „Igel“ vom 4.7.85 <The
Brandenburg District Administration’s Department VII’s Updated Report dated
July 4th, 1985 on the Operative Personal Checks „Igel“>, BStU, Ast
Berlin, AOPK 2172/83, pages 42-45).
And the MfS wanted to make
provisions for the time after the release from prison, too. Mielke’s agent,
Gerhard Neiber, wrote: „In my opinion,
it ought be considered how we can compromise the ‘KPD’ members, now arrested
in the GDR, in their relations with other people and, above all, with the
„KPD“ so that we shall be able to release them from prison and to deport
them into the FRG in order to promote the disintegration of the ‘KPD’ and to
deprive the persons made East German migrants into the West of all possibilities
of coming into contact with kindred spirits.“ (Neiber’s letter dated
December 3rd, 1982, Information 75/308/83; Vorschlag
<der HA IX> des MfS ueber die Anwendung weiterer Moeglichkeiten zur
Zersetzung der feindlichen Gruppierung ‘Sektion DDR’ der ‘KPD’ aus der
Sicht des zu bearbeitenden Ermittlungsverfahrens vom 19.7.82 <The MfS’
(Main Department IX) Proposal - dated July 19th, 1982 - of applying further
possibilities of disintegrating the hostile group of the ‘GRD Section’ of
the ‘KPD’ from the point of view of preliminary proceedings to be
prepared>, BStU, ZA, AU 2409/83, vol. 7, pages 2678 f. In the author’s
personal environment the execution of such measures has been proved <cf. Bericht
der Arbeitsgruppe XXII vom 1.12.82 (The Team XXII’s Report dated December
1st, 1982), BStU, ZA, Neiber 90, pages 24-27>.)
Neiber wanted to allow a
release from prison and deportation into the West only after the possibilities
of compromising had been prepared (cf. Gerhard Neiber’s letter to Harry Dahl
dated April 14th, 1982; BStU, ZA, Neiber 90, page 225. Two relatives, too, of
imprisoned KPD members were released into the West <and it was even agreed
that they could re-enter the GDR> „in
order to make both persons suspected of having been active for the MfS for many
years and of having moved into the West on behalf of our organs“
<Information 75/3506/83>).
Preventive
Measures Against the GDR Section’s Reconstruction
Beside the fear that public
media could report about activities of the KPD, the MfS’ main concern was to
avoid that the KPD was able to re-organize the GDR Section. Therefore, all
possible activities should be nipped in the bud. For that purpose, the MfS once
more employed ist unofficial collaborators who were put in charge of suggesting
their West German instructors now that a further engagement in the GDR would be
meaningless or useless. To that aim, it was necessary for them to act in a
clever manner: „Careful considerations
must be made and the proper arguments must be worked out, useful by qualified
IMs in order to prevent from the constitution of an own ‘KPD’ in the GDR.
The arguments must be - for all IMs employable - so original that the enemy will
not at all be able to suspect that they are steered by the MfS.“ (Neiber
reproducing Mielke’s instructions; cf. Neiber’s letter dated December 3rd,
1982)
He continued with writing that
- should the Party (KPD)* not be prevented from a further engagement - it must
at least be made sure that ist structures within the GDR could be cleared up
very easily. The best opportunities for such purpose were not offered by the
organizational principle up till,22 consisting - similar to that during the Nazi
rule - in different instructors who showed different GDR cells, which contacted
one another in a conspiratorial manner only, how to act. The MfS would have
preferred a special committee between the West KPD and the East KPD (with
competence for the GDR cells) as - under such circumstances - unofficial
collaborators could easily have gained an overall view. (The MfS tried to help
ist Ims within the GDR cells to appreciate such ideas and to give them the
proper arguments for the KPD leaders: „The
invitation of an IM for paticipation at the 5th party congress of the ‘KPD’
(in November/December 1983) shall be used to exert personal influence on
‘KPD’ officials in order to prevent them from forming and propagating an
independent party in the GDR. An independent party might be presented as
breaking-up of the ‘KPD’ because of being in opposition to the all-German
idea of the party and of possibly being interpreted in the GDR as an
anticonstitutional association. The counter-proposal should be to have the
further instruction of the personal bases in the GDR carried out by a committee
which must consist of GDR citizens who solely should be instructed by well
versed ‘KPD’ officials.“ <Report dated December 1st, 1982>.)
As the offensive measures
(arrestations and refused entries to the country) did not suffice for totally
suppressing the KPD activities (in the GDR)*, the MfS pretended the Section’s
disintegration to the Party leaders. As per order, its IMs declared
„disappointment with the slow Party construction“, hospitalizations
necessary in short time etc. in order to bow out of the Party. With the aid of
its IMs, the MfS paralyzed the GDR Section’s activities. The „GDR edition“
of the Party’s organ R22OTER MORGEN was stopped. The intervals of
instructors’ visits increased from two months up to six months.
StaSi
Planned Bomb Attack on KPD Comrades
The Radio
Roter Stachel (Red Spur Radio)
In the course of the year
1982, comrades of the Party managed to organize a portable very high frequency
(VHF) transmitter by means of which they broadcasted the programme of Red Spur
Radio on 101 Mc/s from West Berlin into the GDR, the first time at the end of
April 1983 and then each first Monday of a month as from May 2nd, 1983. The
programmes began every time with the identity melody of Tirana Radio or of (the
Bert Brecht song)* „Vorwaerts und nicht
vergessen...“ („Let’s go and not forget...“). Thereafter came
political news put into words in an engaging manner as well as the GDR
Section’s demands deliberatedly popularized. For instance, the text of the
transmission dated January 1st, 1984 was as follows (extracts): „Red
Spur Radio. Red Spur Radio. Red Spur Radio. Red Spur Radio. You are hearing the
radio of the illegal communist party in the GDR. We shall broadcast every first
Monday of a month as from 9:30 AM via VHF 101 Mc/s. Peace
movement: The SED (the GDR Socialist Unity Party of Germany) leadership
forced their pressure on church and independent peace groups after the beginning
of stocking up on arms in the FRG and the end of the Martin Luther year. In many
towns the authorities proceeded against armement opponents and pacifists with
house searches, arrests and imprinonments (...)
Where is democracy in our
democratic republic? The GDR is a
prison of workers and peasants not only as it prevents its citizens who are fit
for work except for the prominent party liners from leaving the country by walls
and mines, by barbed wire and automatic firing devices, but also in the
word-for-w22ord sense as the prisons are not overcrowded by racketeers,
speculators etc. but just by such sincere people who commit nothing but putting
their own critical point of view. Is that socialist? Is that democratic?“
The transmitter was installed
and operated for short time each in an air-raid shelter (from the time of the
Second World War)* at Humboldtshain (<a forest in the West Berlin district
and former stronghold of the workers’ movement before the Nazi rule
called>* Wedding). Very short broadcasting times (between five and twelve
minutes) as well as hedging the hiding place by guards were to prevent the West
Berlin police or the (West German postal service called)* Deutsche Bundespost
from tracking the illegal radio station down. Ten persons at least were directly
concerned with this undertaking.
The operation of this
transmitter gave Mielke and his staff quite a headache. At the latest since the
end of the year 1982, the MfS had been informed of the fact that the KPD had
invested in an underground transmitter. The MfS started measures in order to
locate the position. Within few days, eight stationary and six portable radio
beacons were employed. „It was managed
further to narrow down the position of the hostile transmitter by offensive
measures of locating its position, prepared and executed - and supported by the
Soviet brother organ - with the aid of a specially prepared motor vehicle and
with appropriate technique of body direction finding.“ (Letter dated July
5th, 1983 of the leader of the Main Department XXII to Neiber)
After the Humboldtshain forest
had been narrowed down as approximate position of the transmitter the StaSi sent
their unofficial collaborators with contact to the enemy (IMB), immediately
before the next broadcast, to the area in order to locate the exact position
(cf. Vorschlag des Leiters der Abteilung
vom 23.6.83 für die Durchfuehrung von Offensivmassnahmen zur Stoerung der
Vorbereitung des sogenannten 5. Parteitages der „KPD“ <The department
leader’s proposal of taking offensive measures in order to disturb the
preparation of the so-called 5th Party Congress of the „KPD“, dated June
23rd, 1983>; BStU, ZA, Neiber
91, pages 288-292; BStU, ZA, AIM 255/91, vol. 2).
Finally, the MfS were able to
locate a deserted air raid shelter on a little hill and had the „scene of the
crime“ investigated for traces between the transmitting times. During the next
broadcast, the Mean Department III made video recordings of all suspected
persons. Other IMs visited the West Berlin KPD activists being under
consideration for direct participation in the operation of the transmitter
exactly at the time of the announced broadcasts in order to obtain further
indications of the question who ranked with the directly responsible persons.
As a whole, nine unofficial
collaborators were employed for that. As from October 1983, specially trained
people of the Main Department VIII/6 competent for observation and investigation
were employed at West Berlin. These people should observe the dwellings of the
KPD official, too, whose apartment was suspected by the StaSi to be the store
room of the transmitter between the broadcasting times (cf. Information
320/331/83 der Abteilung XXII vom 9.9.83 zum Stand der Bearbeitung des illegalen
Senders der „KPD“ <The Department XXII’s information 320/331/83 on
the latest development of treatment of the illegal transmitter of the „KPD“,
dated September 9th, 1983>; BStU, ZA, Neiber 93, pages 185-187).
In treating the Red Spur
Radio, the StaSi took profit from the fact that the West Berlin Radio
Controlling and Measuring Service (Funkkontroll- und Messdienst) was searching
for the exact position of the transmitter. Police vans of the West Berlin police
were ready for intervention in the Humboldthain area. At the time of the next
announced broadcast on October 3rd, 1983, forces of both Berlin parts, West and
East, were on the go in the Humboldthain forest - in vain, however, as the
extensive search measures attracted attention. The park called Viktoriapark in
the Kreuzberg district of Berlin was elected as position for the October
broadcasting programme.
It was probably in the first
days of January 1984 that the MfS decided no more to tolerate the transmitter
operation. Neiber proposed several offensive measures for that purpose. Neiber
took into consideration to have the transmitting devices stolen or destroyed by
IMs. The GDR Ministry of Post and Telecomminication were to protest violently
against the West Berlin Senate, the Deutsche Bundespost (German Federal Post
Office) and the French Allied Forces (as the transmitting area belonged to the
French Occupied Sector of West Berlin established afer the Second World War)*
for not having tuned their transmitting frequencies in co-ordination with the
GDR ministry. Should this measure, too, have no effect, „physical elimination has to be
prepared.“ Horst Maennchen, leader of the Main Department III,
evidently toyed with the idea of destroying the transmitting device by using an
explosive charge. The constructional parts employed for that purpose should be
out of Western design only in order to avoid the suspicion that the GDR was
involved in that crime. The detonation was to be made by remote control or
automatically by starting the transmitter. (cf. Varianten- und Stufenplan des Leiters der HA III zum weiteren Vorgehen
gegen den Sender „Roter Stachel“ vom 23.1.1984 <The Main Department
III Leader’s variation- and step-by-step plan for further processing against
the „Red Spur“ radio, dated January 23rd, 1984>; BStU, ZA, Neiber 93,
pages 67-69).
The operaters of the
transmitter would have been seriously injured or even killed but the GDR State
Security did not shrink back from such measures against the KPD.
The MfS took profit from the
fact that they succeeded in discontinuing the operation of the transmitter with
the aid of IMs. At the MfS’ behest, the IMs had persuaded the Party leaders in
the West for months that transmissions could not clearly be received, that the
news were outdated in content etc. Together with the tracing and search measures
of the Federal Post Office, that fact definitely tipped the scales in favour of
stopping the transmitter operation. The broadcast of February 1984 was the last
of the Red Spur Radio. (Against a possible revival of the transmitter operation,
the Department XXII/3 started the prophylactic Operative Dossier called
„Sender“ <„transmitter“>.)
After the transmitter had been
stopped the GDR State Security Service was able to note having „rejected the
enemy’s activities“ succeassfully - from their point of view. That was the
way in which it has been seen by the MfS in 1986. Mielke who had given top
priority to that matter was very satiosfied with his collaboratos’
performance. „Operative work up to now
was led very well. Recognition for all comrades“, he had his agent Neiber
tell the collaborators of the Department XXII during a service meeting.
On direction level, it was
decided that the treatment of the Party (KPD) in future should be delegated,
above all, to the Main Department XX and to the Main Administration A as a
delegation of the matter to the Department XXII („Terrorism“) did not appear
usefull. Later on, with the „list of
hostile objects“ (Geheime
Verschlusssache <calssified document; GVS> 4/85) it was precisely laid
down what MfS’ team shoul in future be competent for what „hostile
object“(cf. Geheime Verschlusssache 4/85
vom 15.2.1985: Bekaempfung feindlicher Stellen und Kraefte im Operationsgebiet,
die subversiv gegen die DDR und andere sozialistische Staaten taetig sind
<ausser imperialistische Geheimdienste und kriminelle
Menschenhaendlerbanden> <Classified Document 4/85 dated February 15th,
1985 - Fighting against enemy services and forces in the operational area who
are active in a subversive manner against the GDR and other socialist States
(besides imperialistic secret services and criminal gangs of body trade)>;
BStU, ZA, Dst, 103142).
From that time on, the Main
Administration A II had to deal with the KPD in the West whilst the Department
XXII/3 was responsiuble for controlling the remainders of the GDR Secion. As the
Section was a mere shadow of its former self, this Service team was able to
confine itself to continuing some OPK (operative Personenkontrollen = operative
identity checks)* of especially „dangerous“
Party activists.
In the West, the KPD ran into
a vital crisis as from 1983. As from 1985, it resulted in internal conflicts the
course and confrontations of which were exactly registered by the MfS. The StaSi
was highly happy of that development. This development was then, on October 5th
1986, sealed by the union with the
(Trotskist) Group of International Marxists (GIM) to the Vereinigte
Sozialistische Partei (United Socialist Party <VSP>).
The Marxists-Leninists in the
Party started with reconstruction of the KPD in 1985.
The competent Service team for
fighting against the GDR Section was wound up on September 1st, 1986, the
residual tasks was continued by the Department XXII/8 („International
Terrorism“, without great effort, however. In February 1989, the Department
XXII/8 terminated the „treatment“ of the residues of the GDR Section
definitely. (cf. Beschluss der Abteilung
XXII/9 zur Archivierung des OV „Sektion“ vom 22.2.1989 <The
Department XXII/8’s Resolution of filing the operative dossier called
„Section“, dated February 22nd, 1979>; BStU, ZA, AOP 2798/78, vol. 1).
The
MfS - the revisionist SED’s shield and sword
.
The State Security Ministry
began ist activities (in 1952) with approximately 4,000 collaborators and
disposed of about 100,000 full-time StaSi people in 1989 at its end.
Approximately 500,000 unofficial collaborators were there in addition (cf. „Die
offizielle Bilanz des letzten DDR-Innenministers“ <„The official
balance of the last GDR Minister of Interior“>, <report in the West
Berlin newspaper>* DER TAGESSPIEGEL, September 8th, 1990).
We have to add the estimated
number of 6,000 „officers in special employment“ („Offiziere in besonderem
Einsatz“ <OibE>) as well as an unknown number of so-called „unknown
collaborators“ (U-Mitarbeiter). With all them, the StaSi were the biggest
employer of the whole GDR.
The whole country was kept under dragnet surveillance and spying. At the
end of the GDR, there were holdings of StaSi dossiers measuring 180 current
kilometers with about 6,000,000 personal dossiers.
(The GDR total population came to 16.8 million residents.)
Fear of prosecution by this
„machine of omnipotence and lawlessness“ was poked with premeditation, being
an important support of maintaining the power of the revisionist SED..
It does not matter whether
Mielke indeed believed to be a communist or not. With an annual salary of
79,062.50 MDN (GDR marks) (whilst the GDR lowest wages were of 4,000 MDN per
annum), he was capable of having a fantastic conduct of his life. A classy
lifestyle was one of these „leaders’“ features. The countryside had been
parcelled out by hunting grounds among these top nobs. And like aristocracy,
they banged away into wild boars, red deers, hares etc. Mielke solely blowed
60,000 MDN of the annual budgetary means for his own passion for hunting, in
this case - hunting for animals. We can say that the SED chiefs lived already in
communism although in a „communism of philistines“.
Whilst their methods and their
working style were those of gangsters, all things were done with a red glamour.
They called their State Security „socialist“
and their collaborators „tchekists“.
In the MfS’ opinion, the „enemy“
is „dangerous“ and „shrewd“, working in a „criminal“
matter, with „blackmail“ and „intimidation“,
„wilful deceit“, „terror“
and „cunning“. The own doing,
however, is described with attributes like „revolutionary“,
„scientist“, „trusting“, „creative“
and „progressive“.
With a schizophrenia to a such
high degree, it it no wonder that - on November 13th, 1989 in the (former East
German) People’s Parliament Erich Mielke, „the
popular and honoured labour leader“, claimed - with respect to his
relation with the maltreated GDR citizens: „Ich
liebe euch doch alle.“ („But I love you all.“)
Summary
The StaSi was the tool of the
revisionist SED. Their working manner, their methods and their underhand
practices corresponded with their revisionist way of thinking.
In the diary „The
Superpowers“, Comrade Enver Hoxha wrote that the revisionist parties have
nothing but a formal existence (as communist parties), „as
other laws, other principles, other issues are working.“ And he continued
with writing: „Khrushtchov and his
hangers-on are crooks“ who are commuting their countries into police
states. They have an excellent command of the method of „pretending
something never happened“. That is a very good description of the
revisionist GDR.
The SED regime had taken the
lead of the revisionist GDR society. They did not base their power on the
„99.9 per cent“ of the population (election results) but on the State
Security willing to commit every crime, on the 22VoPos (members of the so-called
People’s Police), on the army (the so-called National People’s Army NVA)* -
the Wall and the barbed wire fences included -, and on the Soviet Army. The SED
party machine wanted to command the country to the end of time. Almighty and
with features of megalomania, the SED bigwigs wanted to rule. They were afraid
of nothing but general public. The masses were - in their eyes - good for
nothing but for being manoeuvred. Their motto was: „You
are working well and we are ruling well!“ and „We take care of you.“ (Welfare socialism)
Socialism is nothing but a
necessary stage of passage into communism. That is our actual end. We are,
however, no dreamers of pure phantasy who believe that communism could be
realized from one day to the next. Socialism - with all its weak points and half
measures of the social situation - is forming people. That may be negative, too.
It is, however, not possible
to overcome the old shapes of division of labour and every hierarchy. In leading
officials, an awareness of ruling, of being better, of knowing all things better
had developed whilst, in persons who are performing executive activities, a
mentality of subordination, a feeling of inferiority had spread out. Such
originally unconscious tendencies resulted in a base of changing power in
society. The ones become real rulers, the working people get again ruled. The
leaders and directors are no more suspending but cementing the contrast between
the those at the top and those at the bottom. Such process results in
establishing a new class of slavedrivers who call themselves „socialists“.
We call such stage of passage
revisionism. It is no more socialism but still no open capitalism. The way is
pointed for capitalism. Such formation of society has not the right to exist in
today’s period, the period of imperialism and of socialism and will, sooner or
later, lapse back into capitalism, or the way ahead will again pointed for
socialism. Socialism, however, would include the overthrow of the revisionist
clique. That was the aim the GDR Section of the KPD fought for, at great cost.
An important support of
maintenance of power consisted in the fairy tale of „really existent socialism“ in the GDR. This propagandist tale
spread by them must not at all be questioned. Here you have some
of the main reasons of massive prosecution of Marxists-Leninists in the GDR.
Unmasking the social cover meant an threat of existence for the revisionists and
must be prevented to great length, even by murder and terror.
For long years, the KPD in the
GDR conducted a comprehensive fight for a state which could have been rightly
called socialist. It came in grief but the fight was not useless. The
experience, the lessons drawn from it will be very useful for further knowledge
of the passage society from socialism to capitalism. And up to the fall of the
GDR, comrades of the illegal GDR Section of the KPD fought for the downfall of
the revisionist regime, against the assumption of power by the capitalists and
(the West German Federal Chancellor)* Helmut Kohl, for the reconstruction of
socialism. In spite of the StaSi’s efforts they were not able to totally
suppress the Marxist-Leninist resistance.
And today? The revisionist
society formation has passed into capitalism/imperialism according to the
predetermined pattern. The KPD continues existing, is developing. The SED
disappeared but was survived by successors and uncritical hangers-on in several
other organizations who have been wallowing in GDR nostalgia and admiring that
society as „socialist“ till now. The MfS has been annulled but parts of it
are now working for the German federal secret services.
Herbert Polifka
Communist Party of Germany (KPD)
Supplement:
In 1981, the StaSi searched my
dwelling at Magdeburg „officially“. That resulted in a charge (against me)*
because of „public degradation“
(of the GDR)* according to section 220 (of the GDR penal code)*, 2 years of
prison were sentenced suspended on a 3-year probation and a fine of 7,000 MDN.
In 1994, a new search of my
dwelling and preliminary proceedings took place „officially“, because of „maintenance
of the KPD“. This time, the measures were taken by another company: the
German federal state security. Thanks to our campaign and to national and
international solidarity, this attack was repulsed and the preliminary
proceedings were stopped.
As at the time of StaSi,
today’s spying, prosecution and terror will not dissuade us from our fight. On
the contrary! With the downfall of the revisionist regime, capitalism has shown
its features again clear and without make-up. The „victorious“ capitalism is
a society formation in decline. Necessity of fighting for socialism has shown
itself more clearly else.
.
(Text
from: Roter Morgen No. 24 of
December 24, 1997, No. 1 of January 21 and No. 2 of February 5, 1998)
*)
Translator’s explanation.