Some
months ago, an extensive 45-page DIN (German Industrial Standard) A4-size work
was published by the official of the Federal Republic of Germany in charge of
the records of the State Security Service of the former German Democratic
Republic (Bundesbeauftragter fuer die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes
der ehemaligen Deutschen Demokratischen Republik; BStU). The series, edited by
the Department for Education and Research (Abteilung Bildung und Forschung), was
written by Tobias Wunschik, and was entitled "The Maoist KPD/ML and the
Destruction of its GDR Section by the Ministry of State Security, MfS" (*) ("Die
maoistische KPD/ML und die Zerschlagung der Sektion DDR durch das Ministerium
fuer Staatssicherheit, MfS"). It was the first paper on the GDR Section
written from a bourgeois point of view which has been published since the
annexation of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) to the Federal Republic of
Germany (FRG).
In
the FRG media - press, radio and television - there existed, until then, nothing
but one type of opposition within the GDR: the opposition of well-known writers,
singers-songwriters and scientists, such as "communists" like (the scientist)
Robert Havemann or (the singer-songwriter) Mr. Wolf Biermann who, for many
years, appeared in public with the label of an "opposition communist". For such
mister "comrades" the bourgeoisie is generous.
In
November, 1997, Biermann was once again awarded a prize. This time it was the
National Prize awarded by the German National Foundation (Deutsche
Nationalstiftung) (more than 100,000 German marks). Biermann was honored as a
person "who in his own way contributed to the growing together of the two
parts of Germany", as was stated by someone of high rank. And in January,
1998, the mister "comrade" was invited to be a guest of the "private conference"
(Klausurtagung) of the (Bavaria) state group of the Christian Social Union
residing in Bonn (Bonner CSU-Landesgruppe) in the upper Bavarian village of
Wildbad Kreuth.
And
immediately (after the GDR's annexation by the FRG), a street was named after
Havemann, while so many other streets which had been named after anti-fascists
and "evil" communists were renamed. The above type of opposition was and is
described to the last detail.
But
the media kept silent about the resistance of Marxist-Leninists within the GDR.
While
a comprehensive history of the GDR Section is still to be written, a qualified
bourgeois researcher has, in the above-mentioned grey booklet, presented a
treatise of interest.
The
archive material of the Party (KPD/ML) and information given by persons involved
must still be analyzed in the light of the dossiers of the MfS on individuals.
Until
now, only a few activists have been allowed access to "their own" MfS dossiers.
With
the aid of the above mentioned work - a doctoral thesis - further details about
the illegal activities of the Party can be researched, details which cannot be
understood by only studying the StaSi's (*) (Staatssicherheitsdienst) dossiers
on individuals. The insight relating only to an individual's "own" dossier
obstructs the overall view of its illegal activities and the countermeasures
taken by the MfS. The MfS's strategy and tactics, for instance, were dealt with
in the reports of Department (Abteilung) XXH/1 entitled "Operative Dossier -OV-
GDR Section of the KPD/ML" (Operativer Vorgang - OV - 'Sektion'). These central
plans of disintegration and liquidation are not found in the individual StaSi
dossiers. Tobias Wunschik's work is a "treasure chest" of extensive quotations
from sources.
As
an expression of his basic bourgeois attitude, Wunschik's political assessments
may, for the moment, be left aside.
Tobias
Wunschik's comments are supplemented by information, documents and MfS documents
on the "Magdeburg" and "Weisswasser" cells of the GDR Section.
At
the end of 1975 and beginning of 1976, the foundation by the KPD/ML of its own
section in the GDR was made public. The corresponding declaration was published
in (the Party's central organ) Roter Morgen of February 7, 1976.
While
the KPD/ML had already been formed in 1968 in the FRG, the nucleus of the GDR
Section emerged within the GDR itself.
In
the beginning of the 1970s, some students in the eleventh and twelfth grades at
an Extended Secondary School (Erweiterte Oberschule; EOS) in Berlin got together
to study the texts of the classical authors of Marxism-Leninism independently of
the official version propagated by the SED (Socialist Unity Party of Germany,
state party of the GDR). They were not the only ones in the GDR doing this at
that period.
Other
interested people among their friends and families joined them, so that, in the
course of time, a little circle of employees (e.g. in home education and
technical fields) and students (e.g. of medicine, language and literature) was
formed. In reading the basic texts of Marxist-Leninist social theory they came
more and more to the conclusion that a deep gap existed between theory and
practice in "actually existing socialism" ("Situation Report by the Working
Group XXII of the Berlin BV <Regional Administration of the StaSi> on the
Present State of Investigation of the GDR Section of the 'Communist Party of
Germany' dated January 18, 1982") (cf. "Sachstandsbericht der AG
<Arbeitsgruppe> XXII der BV <Bezirksverwaltung fuer
Staatssicherheit> Berlin zum gegenwaertigen Stand der Bearbeitung der
'KPD'-Sektion DDR vom 18.1.1982" , BStU, ZA, AU 2409/83, vol. 206-214).
In
Magdeburg, during 1969-70, pupils, students and apprentices got together to form
the Progressive Youth (Progressive Jugend) (former Commune 13 <Kommune
13>), inspired - among other things - by the Black Panthers. Besides the
classical authors of Marxism-Leninism, various forbidden texts (of Mao, Stalin,
the Black Panthers, etc.) were read and discussed by this youth group, whose
activities were GDR-wide and which comprised about 100 young people.
After
the Progressive Youth had been disintegrated and destroyed, in 1976 the "hard
core" of the Progressive Youth formed a KPD/ML cell.
In
Rostock, too, an autonomous circle of students was formed with a similar
political orientation. Being interested in further ideological inspiration, many
of these groups and circles - by themselves - got in touch with various left
organizations in West Berlin and with the Albanian embassy in East Berlin.
Besides
the young people, who were the majority within the GDR Section, some older,
battle-hardened comrades joined the Section. For instance, comrade Heinz Reiche
("Opa" <Grandpa> Reiche), who had spent 11 years in Nazi prisons and
concentration camps, took part in activities in Weisswasser (a little township
south of Cottbus). Heinz Reiche had already in the 1950s come into conflict with
the SED.
During
the following years (after 1970), the KPD/ML was successful in gaining
supporters and organizing them into party cells in the GDR. These cells were
inspired by the cell system of the illegal KPD during the Nazi dictatorship.
Until
1980, almost a dozen such cells were formed. According to Wunschik's
information, the total number of members or supporters of the KPD/ML in the GDR
amounted to three dozen people. In addition, there were about 50 to 60
sympathizers who were in direct personal contact with the above-mentioned
circle. (These figures are based on findings of the StaSi).
Several
old, battle-hardened communists were also active within the KPD. That was shown
by the following example of a Berlin cell. According to the Party Archives
(PA-Archiv), there were:
"1)
Fritz (72 years old), since 1942 illegal, prisoner in Sachsenhausen CC
(concentration camp), of proletarian origin, steel smelter.
2) Max 1 (73 years old), in 1928 sentenced to 5 years' imprisonment,
subsequently in Sachsenhausen CC together with (the well-known communist singer)
Ernst Busch, of proletarian origin, miner from the Ruhr.
3) Max 2 (70 years old), of proletarian origin, jailed briefly during the Weimar
Republic, today participating in the works committee (Betriebsgruppe) of the
factory.
4) Roemer (28 years old), engineer.
5) Joachim (51 years old), editor, after the (Second World) War trained by the
Party (SED) as an editor, of proletarian origin, worked with several newspapers
(Neues Deutschland, Berliner Zeitung), in jail for 4 1/2 years, later worked as
a gatekeeper.
At present, the group consists of 14 sympathizers who are divided up among
individual comrades."
Approximately
20 instructors and 30 couriers were used as "liaison people" between the FRG and
West Berlin Sections and the GDR Section. 8 per cent of their gross pay was
established as membership dues.
The
activities within the GDR centered on the recruitment of supporters and
sympathizers. The attention of the public was attracted by actions, which were
always spectacular in the GDR. From 1976, numerous leaflets were distributed,
public buildings were painted with slogans, posters were pasted on walls,
lampposts etc. Their own, separate, "GDR edition" of the Roter Morgen was widely
distributed. The communists' voice was distributed in the GDR either by stuffing
it into mailboxes or by putting it in public places (such as phone booths, bus
stops, railway stations, movie theaters, hospitals) or distributing it directly
in factories.
This
newspaper thus became the first regularly-appearing opposition periodical within
the GDR. In the course of an interrogation, a woman involved said: "By
distributing the different issues of the Roter Morgen, I personally saw a
possibility of influencing the working people in a propagandist manner, to
gather and prepare the forces for a conscious transformation of society in the
GDR." (Interrogation Record, dated January 5, 1982) (Protokoll der
Vernehmung, 5.1.82, BStU, ZA, AU 2409/83, vol. 5)
Small
distribution activities of homemade leaflets were planned and realized by the
cells independently. In this way, they intervened in the political events of the
day. At the same time, they promoted Radio Tirana, the only socialist radio
station.
Tobias
Wunschik established that the GDR Section comrades developed considerable
activities. For instance, the East Berlin activists put out a total of 25
different leaflets in 547 different distribution actions in ten months of 1979.
Activities
were also carried out in the factories. Besides propaganda actions (such as
leaflet distribution, slogan painting, etc.), trade union activities were also
carried out. Working within the FDGB (GDR Federation of Free German Trade
Unions) offered good possibilities for drawing attention to social injustices
and for mobilizing colleagues for small actions. The leitmotiv for this was
"the fight for tea-water in the factory", as Lenin called it.
On
the one hand, new sympathizers could be won. On the other hand, there was the
danger of betrayal within this unified trade union which was very closely bound
to the SED.
The
Roter Morgen was very helpful for the communists' illegal activities. This
newspaper, printed on thin paper, was illegally smuggled into the GDR. (At
least, partial editions of the Roter Morgen were printed in the GDR too, as
comrades reported).
Here
is an excerpt from one of many hundreds of letters to the editorial staff of the
Roter Morgen:
"Dresden,
September 9, 1981.
Dear
KPD comrades!
Your
newspaper came to us through thousands of hands. What we could read in black and
white made our hearts swell because few of these convincing facts come to light
here. (...) This state has nothing in common with democracy, since the bigwigs'
parasitism and clique economy is unbearable for the ordinary worker. Therefore
we feel a rapport with the KPD comrades and ask you to carry on as before so
that many people in the GDR (who show interest in it) will read the truth about
the state leadership and find it confirmed.
With
friendly greetings,
Koenig
family, Dresden."
For
the "Cottbus" cell alone, 3,000 copies of the "GDR edition" of the Roter Morgen,
several inner-party materials, a homemade printing apparatus for printing up to
50 stencils, a homemade (Rollapparat), a typewriter, one 35 mm camera as well as
printer's ink and ink pads were smuggled in with the aid of a handful of
couriers until 1979. The D 359 transit train (Munich - Nuernberg - Berlin) was
especially preferred for taking along materials. In such cases, the leaflets
were delivered in bundles by throwing them out of the train traveling past a
certain point, an action which had been precisely planned beforehand. When the
materials were brought in by car, the transport was mostly carried out with the
aid of a specially-prepared fire extinguisher in the courier's vehicle.
The
Party thought that such method of delivery of materials "was almost 100 per
cent safe" (Information by Department II of the Main Administration for
Surveillance, dated February 1, 1982, on a personal conversation with
Horst-Dieter Koch, member of the Central Committee of the KPD and the official
responsible for the GDR Section) (cf. "Information der Abteilung II der HV
A <Hauptverwaltung Aufklaerung> vom 1.2.1982 ueber ein persoenliches
Gespraech mit dem Mitglied des ZK der KPD und verantwortlichen Funktionaer fuer
die Sektion DDR, Horst-Dieter Koch" , BStU, ZA, Neiber 90, pages 275-278).
Furthermore,
illegal communist materials were smuggled in from Poland and the Czechoslovak
Socialist Republic. Albanian literature such as works of comrade Enver Hoxha
were placed at their disposal by the comrades of the Albanian embassy.
These
books were not only used for study but were also sent to consciously selected
people. The "Magdeburg" cell in which I was active was a pioneer in this field.
For instance, it distributed 200 copies of "The Khrushchevites", 250
copies of "Imperialism and the Revolution", about 60 copies of
"Reflections on China" (volumes 1 and 2), thousands of pamphlets on
the fight against the modern revisionists, etc. Also, important foreign language
documents were sent to different revisionist states (such as Poland, Romania,
Soviet Union, Cuba, Hungary, Bulgaria).
Internationalism
rated very highly: comrades of the GDR Section also distributed the Czerwony
Sztandar (Red Flag), organ of the illegal Communist Party of Poland. This
newspaper, also printed on thin paper, was both sent into Poland and given to
Polish citizens who worked in the GDR. At various Magdeburg construction sites,
the Czerwony Sztandar was found over and over again. Donations were illegally
brought into Poland to support the striking colleagues there.
Russian
language publications were left in newsstands of the Soviet army.
The
country-wide activities of the communists could not be kept hidden from the
political secret police of the SED. Erich Mielke (Minister of State Security)
himself gave top priority to the affair (letter from Mielke, dated
March 3, 1976). He repeatedly demanded that the surveillance of the
"GDR Section" be "intensified to the greatest extent". The
aim should not only be the dissolution of the "GDR Section" but also
the destruction of the KPD in the West. More far-reaching were the
considerations of Department XXII responsible for "counter-terrorism"
("Terrorabwehr"): "Also to undermine those hostile forces at
their starting points (FRG, West Berlin) by appropriate measures, to play them
off against one another and to get them involved in sharper clashes with circles
of the extreme right as well as with the power structure of the FRG and West
Berlin" (The Plan for 1976 of Department XXII, dated January 30, 1976) (cf.
"Jahresplan 1976 der Abteilung XXII vom 30.1.76", BStU, ZA, HA XXII
57778, pages 1471-1513, here page 1484).
Responsible
for investigating the Communist Party by the MfS were "Main Department XX" ("Political
Underground") ("Politischer Untergrund") and "Department XXII" ("Counter-Terrorism").
Also "Main Administration for Surveillance" (HV A) (which was especially
directed against the Party "KPD/ML" in the West) as well as "Main Department II"
responsible for counter-espionage (Spionageabwehr). The latter kept the contacts
of the KPD/ML with the Albanian embassy under surveillance. The penal
investigations were undertaken by the Investigation Body of the MfS, "Main
Department IX". "Main Department VII" (responsible for detention centers) acted
against arrested supporters of the Party. When communists were to be followed, "Main
Department VIII" (responsible for observation) was present, and "Main Department
III" ("radio surveillance and defense") ("Funkaufklaerung und
-abwehr")
In
the offensive investigation demanded by Mielke (during interrogations reference
was made to the state and party leader Erich Honecker, who was personally
interested in destroying the Communist Party), the responsible StaSi
collaborators had run into considerable difficulties. The conspiratorial methods
of self-protection of the KPD/ML activities gave them a hard nut to crack.
"The operational investigation of such forces is complicated by their
conspiratorial style of work and by the mistrust in such groups, that leads to a
thorough and lengthy check of new or future members. In addition, relatively
high demands of political education, willingness to make sacrifices, discipline
and reliability are made, especially for officials." (Excerpts from "Information
Report of the Central Evaluation and Information Group -ZAIG- dated October 26,
1979") ("Auskunftsbericht der Zentralen Auswertungs- und Informationsgruppe
- ZAIG - vom 26.10.1979")
When,
beginning in 1979, the KPD/ML intensified its activities in the East, the StaSi
intensified its efforts to discover the "bases" ("Stuetzpunkte") in
the GDR. Starting points were - as Wunschik states - the already existing
findings of "Main Department XX" about two circles in East Berlin and in Rostock
and those of "Main Department II" on GDR visitors to the Albanian embassy. Both
StaSi departments already in 1979 made use of unofficial collaborators
("inoffizielle Mitarbeiter"; IMs) who were active in the GDR Section
or in its immediate environment. With their aid, the MfS discovered more and
more of the contacts of KPD/ML members with one another. For instance, personal
connections were traced, while travelers in transit trains from which materials
had been thrown were checked by the usual method of passport control.
Furthermore, phone taps and mail searches were initiated. Objects smuggled in
were examined for fingerprints.
The
responsible "Department XXII" centered its activities on the "Cottbus cell". The
identity of two cell members from Luebbenau (in the Spreewald) (Niehueser
family) was soon discovered by the MfS. The "Department XXII" contacted these
two cell members and was able to "turn" them and win them over as IMs and then
use them against the KPD/ML. Later on, these two IMs were sent to meetings with
KPD/ML officials in the FRG.
At
the end of 1980, the MfS estimated the number of members, candidates and close
contacts of the GDR Section at about 50 people. For their investigation, the
StaSi used about 20 IMs at that time, and later more than 30. These informers
suggested the existence of another 30 sympathizers.
In
Magdeburg, the MfS had one IM among the four members and three real
sympathizers, and this IM was able to suggest two more fictitious sympathizers.
(IM "Clemens"- real name: Hans Schmidt.)
In
Berlin, the MfS fabricated a cell which was a pure StaSi product. It served to
identify further instructors and couriers, as well as to spread false
information to the leadership of the Party (KPD/ML). In East Berlin, the MfS
used six IMs, in Frankfurt (on Oder) and in Leipzig four IMs each, in
Karl-Marx-Stadt (today Chemnitz) three, in Dresden two IMs and in Cottbus, Halle
(on Saale) and Magdeburg one IM each as KPD/ML members. Against the KPD/ML in
the FRG, there were active three more IMs of the HV A II/6 (two of them KPD/ML
members and one more a skimming-off contact
<"Abschoepfungskontakt">), one IM of the HV A ("Science and
Technical Section" <"Sektor Wissenschaft und Technik">) and one
IM a skimming-off contact of the Department XXII/3 (Summary of Department XXII,
dated October 24, 1983 concerning the unofficial collaborators used in the
framework of surveillance and investigation of the 'KPD')
(cf. "Uebersicht der Abteilung XXII vom 24.10.83 zu den im Rahmen
der Aufklaerung und Bearbeitung der 'KPD' eingesetzten inoffiziellen
Mitarbeitern", BStU, ZA, Neiber 91, pages 249-250).
In
the West itself, the MfS had identified 22 instructors, 33 couriers, 42 false
addresses and 6 false phone numbers of the KPD/ML.
Nevertheless,
again and again slogans were put up and leaflets were distributed by
unidentified KPD/ML members. And even where connections and activities had been
identified, the MfS often did not have unequivocal proof to be able to take
penal actions against the persons involved.
After
successful surveillance, the StaSi used various methods to destroy the Section.
These included so-called measures of disintegration. For instance, by well-aimed
measures of an IM, a member of the "Cottbus cell" ("Grandpa" Heinz) was
discredited with the Party's head office, which led to his expulsion from the
Party by the "GDR Section's leadership".
Cells
which could not be controlled by the MfS were destroyed by the MfS, for example
by making sure that an activist was increasingly stressed on his or her job to
prevent him or her from carrying out extensive organizational activities.
Furthermore, the StaSi itself stirred up continual mistrust within the Section,
by sparing the leading activists from offensive measures (such as arrest or
refusal of entry (into the country)). By such means, the people involved were
exposed to suspicion of being police informers.
Other
measures were conscription for military service or reserve service. For
instance, one member of the Magdeburg cell was called up only so that the IM
could perform his work of disintegration unhindered.
With
the aid of IMs, feelings of uncertainty on ideological questions were created in
the cells. For example, the IM Niehueser made harsh attacks against the Party of
Labor of Albania (PLA) by defending Maoism. His Maoist positions, however, were
rejected. Besides, the dispute with Maoism in the GDR was less problematical
than in the West. In the expectation that people would resign from the Party,
Guenther Niehueser pursued an unrestrained smear campaign.
The
MfS also took advantage of the increasingly strained relations between the KPD
and the PLA from 1983. Through Main Department II (with the aid of unofficial
collaborators), the MfS plotted to strengthen the skeptical attitude of the
members of the Albanian embassy toward the KPD. ("Proposal for continuing the
political and operative measures for the struggle against the 'KPD', dated
October 25, 1984") (cf. "Vorschlag fuer die Weiterfuehrung der
politisch-operativen Massnahmen zur Bekaempfung der 'KPD' vom 25.10.1984",
BStU, ZA, AOP 2796/89, vol. 1, pages 194-197).
In
order to win over further sources in the Section, the StaSi would use any means.
For example, it made use of one Party activist's marital crisis to obtain
discrediting information about him and thus to put him under pressure. ("Supplement
to the proposal to win over the KPD/ML official 'Kagel' by making use of
compromising materials, dated May 20, 1980") (cf. "Ergaenzung zum Vorschlag
zur Werbung des KPD/ML-Funktionaers 'Kagel' unter Ausnutzung kompromittierenden
Materials vom 20.5.1980", BStU, ZA, AOP 643/85, vol. 1, pages 172-173).
The
MfS tried to destroy the marriage of another communist by a manipulated love
affair and to enmesh him in criminal activities. The female MfS agent, however,
failed in this attempt. Later on, they tried to win over the comrade's wife as
an IM.
Blackmail
and pressure were used against family members. Positions at universities were
denied. The pension for "victims of fascism" was used for blackmail. At the same
time, known communists were put under surveillance. In Magdeburg, for instance,
the apartments of KPD comrades, including mine, were bugged. For many years,
they were continuously monitored! In my StaSi dossier (until now it comprises
more than 10,000 pages, but some pages are still missing) were duplicate keys to
my apartment.
For
decades, the StaSi had ruled over the people in the GDR. During that period,
this tentacle of the revisionist party grew into a monstrous formation. There
was hardly a family, hardly an individual who could feel fully free. Neither
from spying, intimidation, blackmail and persecution or from attempts at
recruitment by the StaSi.
Under
the heading "security policy, socialist, one can find the following
self-definition of the MfS: the MfS had, according to the "class directions
of the Party, (...) as its priority, to prevent and hinder, to uncover in a
timely manner and to combat all the enemy's subversive assaults, particularly on
the defense capacity of socialism, on the accomplishment without disturbance of
the Party's economic strategy and on the ideological foundations of the ideology
of the working class." (The Dictionary of the MfS' Political and Operative
Activity <Classified Document>, second edition, compiled at the Ministry's
Law School at Potsdam-Eiche, 1985. Reprint: Ch. Links Publishers, Berlin 1996)
(cf. Das Woerterbuch der politisch-operativen Arbeit des MfS <Geheime
Verschlusssache; GVS>, zweite Auflage. Erarbeitet an der Juristischen
Hochschule des Ministeriums in Potsdam-Eiche, 1985. Nachdruck: Ch. Links Verlag,
Berlin 1996 ).
It
is striking that protection of the "ideology of the working class" was among the
tasks for the State Security Service, which thus also laid claim to the duties
of a type of "thought or ideology police".
And
the "ideology of the working class" (i.e. revisionism) could even be "attacked"
by the youngest citizens of the country. Consequently, children could also be
considered "negative forces".
For
myself, I had already attracted attention when I was a youth of 14 years.
Already as a child, I was very interested in literature and history. Nicolai
Ostrovsky's novel "How the Steel was Tempered" made a deep impression on me.
I
was still very young when I read the Manifesto of Marx and Engels. Later on, I
read other classical authors.
I
read these "free" from the usual explanations. There was no school teacher, no
leader of the FDJ (Free German Youth) or anyone else who gave me an
SED-interpretation of them. On my own, I studied a series of texts of classical
authors. (Although these were sometimes lengthy.) These were important bases of
my opposition views.
The
injustices that could be seen everywhere in society and the obvious gap between
theory and practice found their explanation in the texts of the classical
authors.
My
different opinion during civics lessons, in discussions in summer camp about the
intervention of the Warsaw Pact States in the CSSR (Czechoslovak Socialist
Republic) in 1968 was enough for the MfS. That I openly listened to Radio Tirana
in the children's summer camp "aggravated" the situation.
When
I was 17 years old I had my "own" operative dossier (OV). The purpose of such an
OV was to compile information and detailed data, in order to initiate
preliminary proceedings and to begin the work of disintegration.
Important
measures of the OV are as follows:
The
aim was to gather evidence of a suspected criminal offense and to prevent such
activities. Everything was laid down according to definite guidelines of the
Council of Ministers for secret service activities:
A)
The citizen's letters were opened ("M" measure, postal control).
B) The apartment was broken into (conspiratorial search of apartments by
Department VIII).
C) Installation of bugs in the apartment (measure 26B).
D) Observation (Department VIII) and clandestine photography (measure 26F).
E) Phone conversations were monitored (measure 26A).
F) A video camera the size of a pinhead was installed in the apartment (measure
26D).
G) The citizen was pushed out of his or her job (by operative
games/combination).
H) The citizen was tempted into acting and reacting by operative
games/combinations. The citizen should be made to carry out careless actions to
incriminate or clear himself or herself of a charge.
I) Police informers were assigned to the citizen (use of an IM by the officer
responsible).
(Guideline No. 1/76 for Development and Investigation of Operative Dossiers>
OV/GVS <operative dossier/classified document> MfS 008-100/76) (Cf. the
Richtlinie Nr. 1/76 zur Entwicklung und Bearbeitung Operativer VorgŠnge).
Should
the measures produce evidence that the observed person was a citizen critical of
the GDR, he or she was immediately entered in the list of persons to be isolated
in crisis situations. In the Directive No. 1/67 (Secret Command Affair)
(Direktive Nr. 1/67 <Geheime Kommandosache>) tasks were laid out for an
authorized preparation for setting up detention camps. In Appendix 1 of the
Directive "Identification Number System for the Plan for Mobilization" ("Kennziffernsystem
zum Mobilmachungsplan"), the following duties were stated, among others:
creation of bases for isolating such persons who may pose a risk to the defense
capacity of the GDR. The conveyance of such persons should be carried out by
members of the MfS. Assembly sites were to be prepared and transportation into
the isolation camps was to be organized.
From
document GVS MfS 0005-99/86 it can be seen which persons were referred to: GDR
citizens "who would probably pose an acute risk to state security and order
during a state of emergency or who might tolerate or support such actions,
because of their consolidated hostile and fundamentally negative attitude
towards the socialist state and social order based on their previous
appearances, their officially and unofficially known comments, their contacts
and connections as well as certain ways of life or behavior patterns."
Not
to be isolated, but to be arrested immediately (identification number 4.1.1)
were such persons with a so-called hostile intention who "have drawn up
demands for alteration of the state and social order of the GDR by propagating
opinions about a 'democratic socialism' or new models of socialism."
(According
to a statement by a representative of the GDR Attorney General's office on
August 30, 1990, to the government commission for the dissolution of the MFS,
the list of people considered for isolation, as of November 30, 1983, totalled
10,919 persons.)
The
basis of my OV was the assessment that I would openly propagate
pseudo-revolutionary and Maoist views. These would have a "disintegrating"
effect on society and the Party. Perhaps for this reason this Operative Dossier
was filed as a "toxin" OV.
In
this Operative Dossier all measures of the MfS were recorded.
Workplace
assessments (Kaderakte <staff dossiers>) were collected in a
conspiratorial manner. The earliest assessment of me was one from the 6th grade.
Furthermore, all possible assessments had been compiled, that had been
ascertained from various sources (e.g. unofficial collaborators), whether in my
neighborhood, workplace, etc. Medical reports had been compiled and hobbies had
been ascertained.
Postal
surveillance had been initiated.
My
whole family circle had been included in the OV.
It
did not take long until the first "conspiratorial search of my house" was made.
Such
a house search was performed in an extremely careful manner. All residents of
the house were "screened" before the search. Files were made of each of them.
The break-in was planned precisely so as "not to be interrupted," i.e. at that
time no resident of the house was to be home. Each resident was closely
observed. Fictitious cadre discussions were set up, doctor visits were
scheduled, etc. (Legend = deception. A special term of the StaSi jargon.) The
StaSi always maintained a tight grip.
The
purpose of such a house search was to collect information about me. Photographs
were made of the apartment, of books and letters. Newspapers and books were
listed, etc.
Apartment
break-ins always needed the permission of the StaSi chief himself. They were
carried out according to regulations of the Minister. The Minister's orders for
the carrying out of conspiratorial measures were recorded in a big red book.
The
fact that such measures were against existing GDR law is significant for the
GDR. On the one hand was the formal rule of law, on the other hand this law was
trampled on daily. Millions of letters were opened, tens of thousands of
apartments were broken-into and citizens were bugged - all these were criminal
offenses under GDR law.
In
the mid-1970s, my apartment was bugged. Initially there were technical problems,
and an announced renovation of my apartment really made the eavesdroppers sweat.
Only with great difficulty did they succeed in time in removing the bugging
devices for a few days. From that time on, the sound recording devices of the
MfS were working. In the following period, apartment break-ins were done again
and again. The MfS made master keys, and thus I had, so to speak, a "public"
dwelling.
The
bugs themselves were permanently installed and adapted to run for a long time.
Although the dossiers describe a bugging operation limited in time (about 3
months in a year), that does not prove a thing. The extent of the StaSi's
collection-mania was so great that a vast amount of files had to be stored on
microfilms. However, only a part of that still exists.
The
removal of the bugs, however, was not mentioned in the files. But as I was kept
under surveillance as a "hostile-negative" person up to the end of the GDR - an
IM was still assigned to me in 1988 - these devices, too, have probably been
taken over as a "legacy" of the GDR.
At
the same time, I was visually observed: the round-the-clock spying because of my
"negative attitude" toward the GDR can be read as follows:
"5:10
AM - Afro (the investigation name given me by the MfS) gets up.
5:11 - Shaves, brushes teeth.
5:15 - Oase (my wife) gets up. Yawns.
5:15 - Listens to West German radio - NDR 2 (North German Radio channel 2)
5:18 - Oase does her morning toiletry.
5:29 - Afro leaves view.
5:44 - Oase leaving view.
5:45 - Silence reigns in the area.
(...)"
One
observation team "accompanies" me to the workplace.
There
I am under "watch" by the IMs "Bernd" and "Dreher" (turner). "No special
incidents", is the succinct comment.
"2:00
PM -At the main gate. Observation continues.
2:32 - Afro strolls along the street.
2:39 - Afro enters a konsum (state-owned food store). Buys 11.47 marks worth of
goods.
3:01 - Afro enters into view.
3:04 - Afro listens to Albanian music.
4:00 - West German TV is on. A program about F.J. Strauss is on ARD (working
pool of broadcasting corporations of the Federal Republic of Germany).
4:10 - Afro laughs at Strauss (Prime Minister of Bavaria).
4:13 Afro criticizes comrade Erich Honecker (President of the GDR State
Council).
(...)
10:39 - Silence reigns in the area."
Let
us spare ourselves such informers' reports. They only give a little insight into
the informer's daily activity. By the way, the department conducting the
monitoring or observation did not know the reasons for the persecution. Their
motto was: you can't be too sure.
I
must also mention that the MfS prohibited the use of such "unofficial" evidence
in criminal prosecution in order to maintain the conspiracy. Only evidence that
had been obtained "legally" could be used in court. At least appearances had to
be kept up.
The
MfS knew no bounds. Every means that led to success could be used. The
guidelines were the fundamentals of the informers' system. Cynically and full of
contempt for human beings, Mielke laid out the measures of disintegration.
He
gave instructions to "gain knowledge that could be used in an effective
manner for offensive measures to disintegrate
and compromise people."
Against
the KPD, the measures of guideline No. 1/76 were used:
"Classified
Document, MfS No. 100/76.
Mielke, Colonel General.
(pp. 46-48, excerpts:)
2.6: Making Use of Measures
of Disintegration
2.6.1: Aims and Range of Use of Measures of Disintegration
Measures
of disintegration are to be used to take advantage of and increase such
contradictions or differences among hostile-negative forces as will fragment,
paralyze, disorganize and isolate them so that their hostile-negative actions -
including their effects - will be prevented, essentially limited or totally
ended.
(...)
Measures
of disintegration may be used against groups, groupings, and organizations as
well as against individuals and may be used as a relatively independent type of
termination of operative dossiers or in connection with other types of
termination.
2.6.2:
Effective Types of disintegration which may be used are:
-
Methodically discrediting the public reputation, esteem and prestige on the
basis of combining true, verifiable and discrediting facts with false but
plausible, non-refutable and thus also discrediting facts.
- Methodically organizing professional and social failures in order to undermine
the self-confidence of individuals.
- Purposefully undermining convictions in connection with particular ideals,
models, etc. and creating doubts about the person's perspective.
- Creating distrust and mutual suspicion within groups, groupings and
organizations.
- Creating or making use of and increasing rivalries within groups, groupings
and organizations by purposefully making use of personal weaknesses of
individual members.
- Keeping groups, groupings and organizations busy with their internal problems
with the aim of limiting their hostile-negative actions.
- Preventing or limiting in place or time the mutual relations of the members of
a group, grouping or organization on the basis of existing legal provisions,
e.g. by tying them to workplaces, assigning them to far-away workplaces, etc.
In
carrying out the measures of disintegration, reliable, experienced IMs suitable
for solving such problems are to be used with priority.
Effective
means and methods of disintegration are:
(...)
- Making use of anonymous or pseudonymous letters, telegrams, phone calls, etc.,
compromising photographs such as of actual or faked meetings.
- Calculatedly disseminating rumors about certain individuals of a group,
grouping or organization.
- Targeted indiscretion or the faking of deconspiracy of an MfS
counter-intelligence measure.
- Summoning individuals to state departments or social organizations for
plausible or implausible reasons.
Such
means and methods are to be used, improved and developed creatively and with
nuances according to the specific conditions of the operative dossier in
question.
(...)
The
carrying out of measures of disintegration must be done consistently and
strictly. For this purpose, a continuous unofficial supervision of the results
and their effects is necessary. The results have to be documented
precisely."
(To
be continued)
Herbert
Polifka
(Text
from: Roter Morgen No. 24 of December 24, 1997, No. 1 of January 21 and No. 2 of
February 5, 1998)
Communist
Party of Germany (KPD)