CHAPTER V

THE APPROACH TO THE KURDISH NATIONAL MOVEMENT,
THE FEATURES OF THE PARTY'S WORK IN KURDISTAN

• What is the position of your party in Turkey-Kurdistan? What is the basis of your relationship with the Kurdish workers and labourers? Can you tell us about the differences and relations with the Kurdish national movement?

If we start with our differences with the Kurdish national movement first, we think the answers to your other questions will be more clear.

There is a phenomenon which was illustrated by the events of the last five-six years in Kurdistan. However, this phenomenon is either not understood because of the turmoil in Turkey, or suppressed. As is known, there was no significant movement in Turkey-Kurdistan from the period of the Dersim uprising to the 1970s. During this period, in spite of this national stagnation in Turkey-Kurdistan, there was a massive national struggle, mainly in Iraq-Kurdistan and -to a lesser extent- in Iran. This struggle was protracted, even though it had peaks and troughs. Also during this period, the Kurdish movement in Iraq-Kurdistan played a determining role in formulating the political plans, programmes and work of the nationalist or "socialist" Kurdish groups in Turkey-Kurdistan, as well as the regional states and imperialist governments which have interests in Kurdistan. For instance, the core of the traditional policy of Turkey on the Kurdish question was to guard against the political impact of Iraq-Kurdistan.

On the other hand, the Iraqi-Kurdish organisations, for a long time, had the attitude of organising and "mobilising" in Turkey-Kurdistan. Iraq-Kurdistan had always been a central issue in the imperialist rivalry and frictions in the region. It is certain that Iraq-Kurdistan fundamentally influenced the plans , programmes and the work of all the political currents in Turkey-Kurdistan. The slogans "independent Kurdistan" or "independent united Kurdistan" which shaped all political groups of Turkey-Kurdistan without exception are the slogans chanted with an Iraq centred Kurdistan in mind. In short, we can say that apart from being states generally concerned with the Kurdish question or opponent political currents, the central axis in shaping their plans, programmes and work was the movement in Iraq-Kurdistan.

The hidden fact that was raised by the national unrest of the last five-six years in Turkey-Kurdistan is that these political plans on Kurdistan and the Kurdish question did not correspond to economic and social development and were full of illusions. As a result of this all the traditional political plans and programmes collapsed and were put aside. What took place was this: After the national movement had become relatively stable, the comparatively more advanced economic development and evolution in Turkey-Kurdistan was recognised by the imperialist governments, the reactionary states in the region and all the Kurdish parties and groups, mainly centred in Turkey-Kurdistan. This was illustrated by the fact that the attitudes and policies of the concerned states and political groups -including the imperialist countries- were being renewed tactically and/or strategically. Also, Turkey-Kurdistan has become the epi-centre for the regional policies of the concerned forces, policies which frequently clashed. If we approach history, social evolution and facts as materialists, then this is obvious

There is a Kurdish question in the Middle-East and everyone can claim that Turkey-Kurdistan is the "central link" of this question. For instance, PKK is suggesting that Turkey-Kurdistan is the centre. There are others who accept this fact too. That is not the question. The question is to realise the real reasons that determine Turkey-Kurdistan as a central question of the Kurdish question in the whole region, and to understand the political conclusions that flow from this. For instance, is Turkey content with a "struggle" to protect the borders of the Misak-i Milli (National Treaty which determined Turkey's borders in the 1920s) in Kurdistan, as was the case in the past? What regional interests are being taken into consideration in formulating the "renewed" Kurdistan policy of Turkey which is hard pressed by the Kurdish question? And what genuine strategy does Özal's "aspirations" unconsciously reveal? Where is the PKK's struggle for an "independent Kurdistan" getting to? Is its slogan for a Turkish-Kurdish federation and desire for a "political solution" only a tactical manoeuvre? What is the true meaning of the PKK's renewed theoretical and political line? And which class' political ends does it cover? What does the Kurdish bourgeoisie, which is longing for a new agreement with the Turkish bourgeoisie, mean to the other Kurdistan regions and to Turkey? Which class' (economic and political) aspirations lie behind the approach of the Kurdish bourgeoisie to the PKK? Why did Kurdish reformist "socialism" abandon or suspend the slogan "independent Kurdistan"? What prompted the Kurdish ruling classes in Iraq to stay clear (or even to struggle against) Turkey-Kurdistan in contrast to their attitude in the past? How important is the Kurdish question to the internal life, external relations and policies of countries such as Turkey, Iran and Iraq? What will be the contours of the renewed policy approach of the imperialist states to the Kurdish question? And why is "the Hammer Force" "defending" Iraq-Kurdistan based not in Iraq-Kurdistan but in Turkey-Kurdistan?

The questions above can be multiplied many times over. They can be systematically arranged so as to reveal the economic links behind and between facts, phenomena and policies. Since we do not have this opportunity here, let us be satisfied with saying this: There are some people who agree with our party in emphasising the central importance of Turkey-Kurdistan in the Kurdish question in the region and in the struggle on the Kurdish question. Our party, however, differs from all other "socialist" and revolutionary currents on the reasons why Turkey-Kurdistan has gained this central importance and the political results brought about by this phenomenon. In short, we differ from all others in the way we answer the above questions and how we treat the phenomena behind the policies being formulated and implemented.

It is understood and accepted by everyone that the Kurdish question is, at present, the principle problem of Turkey. Turkey's "new" political strategy is not satisfied with just getting rid of the Kurdish question but it is aiming to claim rights in all Kurdistan regions. It is also getting the support of the Kurdish feudal-bourgeois class and bourgeois-socialist circles whose interests correspond to this orientation of Turkey. However, we can say that this fact is being hidden or not being understood. That is the real problem.

It is clear that the "solutions" of the Turkish ruling classes such as "recognition of the Kurdish identity", a "local-federal system" and "federation" are not simply about making allies in Turkey-Kurdistan to defuse the situation and about "making a new agreement" with the Kurdish bourgeoisie. Besides, this is a new platform and has a different target from the previous one which was "defending the borders of Misak-i Milli (national agreement)". This new platform is also parallel to the strategic and tactical requirements of the imperialist centres' Middle Eastern policies that made Turkey-Kurdistan one of the most important factors.

The bourgeoisie and reaction understand and accept the fact that they can "get rid" of the Kurdish question, which has posed many dilemmas to Turkey, by changing this question into an "opportunity". This can make the Turkish state more "powerful" in the Middle-East and more "trustworthy" in the eyes of the imperialist states. They also recognise that the conditions for transforming the "dilemma" into an "opportunity" exist. What is the content of this "opportunity" for the bourgeoisie and reaction? That is clear. It lies in the socio-political phenomena that proved the superiority of the economic and social development of Turkey-Kurdistan vis-a-vis the other Kurdistan regions that have been revealed by the struggle of the last five-six years. Also in the fact that the Kurdish economy is a part of the Turkish economy. Thus, unless inter-imperialist rivalries can provide bigger opportunities, the interests of the Kurdish bourgeoisie in the other Kurdistan regions require them to live "together" with the Turkish bourgeoisie.

Clearly, the Turkish and Kurdish ruling classes organised as the Turkish state are thinking of the opportunity of declaring other Kurdistan regions as their "usurped" lands, of becoming superior to the other regional states, interfering in their internal affairs and of marketing themselves with a higher price to the imperialist states. Let us emphasise that the economic and social conditions exist for the realisation of the "new" common orientation of the Turkish and Kurdish bourgeoisies and of a new agreement between them. Thus, the policy they have been forming is realistic.

The Kurdish groups dominating Iraq-Kurdistan and the main regional states like Iran, Iraq and Syria understand this new tendency that Turkey is "obliged" to more towards. They can see the opportunity that could be given to Turkey by Kurdistan, which is, at present, a dilemma for it. They take all this into consideration when forming their inter-state relations and policies. The imperialist governments, mainly the US, observe these phenomena and take them into consideration. Kurdish reaction represented by Barzani and Talabani has abandoned its previous attitude towards Turkey-Kurdistan and now tends to see it as a rival. Turkey has declared the Iraqi Kurds "brothers" and itself as their "protector". At the same time, the "protector" of Iraq-Kurdistan, the Hammer Force, has been situated in Turkey-Kurdistan. Obviously, it would be myopic to consider these phenomena as temporary tactical policies.

We can say that the awakening and the struggle of the Kurdish people constitute a problem and a dilemma for Turkey. However, the spontaneity of this struggle, the ignorance and disorganisation of the masses and the weakness of their platform, especially in the present conditions, constitute a potential "opportunity" and "possibility" for the bourgeoisie. The Turkish and Kurdish ruling classes (even though there are conflicts between them) realise this fact. Turkish reaction has realised the economic and social imperatives (and the political advantages and disadvantages) that created this "dilemma" and at the same time transformed it into an "opportunity". The conflict between Özal-Demirel over the approach to the Kurdish question is one of the forms Turkish reaction manifests itself in. In essence, however, the dispute is over method rather than fundamentals.

The Kurdish feudal-bourgeois class, with its attendant reformists and "socialists", is learning how to make use of the national awakening and to impose on and market itself with imperialism and the Turkish bourgeoisie at a higher price. They are learning to utilise the economic and political advantages providing this opportunity and how to reorganise themselves as a ruling class. In this context, the economic and political "reforms" prepared for Kurdistan are nothing but a concession made to the Kurdish bourgeoisie to enable it to grow strong and reorganise itself. This is, unfortunately, what the "socialist" currents and groups and the progressive circles cannot or will not realise.

Will the Turkish and Kurdish ruling classes be able to get rid of the dilemma in Kurdistan and succeed in changing this dilemma into a "possibility"? We must state that this does not only depend on the will and wish of the Turkish and Kurdish bourgeoisie. The rapid changes in the Middle-East and the "pecking order" that could be brought about by the rivalry and struggle for hegemony between the big imperialist powers undoubtedly may embroil Turkey too. Consequently, this may put the big powers firmly in the saddle and Turkish and Kurdish reaction may be pulled in different directions by their interests. In addition, no one can deny the fact that in Turkey and Kurdistan the revolutionary advance of the working class and of the popular movement constitutes the key factor in reversing the policies and plans of Turkish and Kurdish reaction.

Today, all one can talk about is the dilemma of Turkey, the attempts it must make to solve this dilemma, and the emerging potential "possibilities". Will the movement in Turkey and Kurdistan give Turkey the "possibility" to "get rid" of this dilemma and transform it into a "possibility", or not? That is the question. Let us also say that when we take into consideration the potential power of the working class of Turkey and the fact that the Middle-East is the focus of imperialist rivalry, the renewed plans of the Turkish and Kurdish bourgeoisies can be seen to be very difficult to realise and little more than forlorn hopes.

In our opinion it is impossible to evaluate the strategies and tactics of the contending classes and political forces in Kurdistan and the region, unless the real phenomena behind the visible facts and the inter-links between these facts are analysed. The picture we partially illustrate here should be considered deeply. In the same way, without doing this, one cannot speak about protecting strategic revolutionary aims and elaborating revolutionary tactics which would contribute to the advance of revolution. Who is struggling against who and why? What are the possibilities, problems and dilemmas of the powers in conflict? What forces can be combined with, how and with what overall purpose? What kind of struggle, against who and what for, etc.?

Obviously, a revolutionary struggle cannot be waged without answering these questions. It is indispensable especially for the socialist and revolutionary currents to give reliable and far-sighted answers to such questions. Otherwise they would inevitably be defeated and become a "left" cover for this or that bourgeois-reactionary policy. In this context, we can say that the position, work and confusion of the "socialist" currents, which are called "the Turkish left" by the PKK and which accept this definition, and of the Kurdish "socialist" groups -except PKK which must be treated separately manifest this fact.

Our party differs from all other political currents in dealing with Kurdistan, with the Kurdish question, with Turkey's other problems linked with the Middle-East as well as the phenomena of conflicts and formation of blocs in the region. Thus, we also differ in the process of forming a political line corresponding to this point of view and the organisational work that flows from it. This also holds true for the differences between our party and the Kurdish national movement, even though they have specific characteristics. What have a significant role behind these differences are the political viewpoint, analysis and perspective, as well as other fundamental questions of revolution. If we make concrete the actual political and organisational differences with the Kurdish national movement, then our party's approach to the facts, its political analysis, perspectives and tactics would become relatively more clear. Our party will be understood better in this way.

THE APPROACH TO THE KURDISH NATIONAL QUESTION AND
THE POLITICAL PLATFORM OF THE PARTY IN NATIONAL STRUGGLE

Your question is very broad. Therefore, it is necessary to keep the discussion relatively wide in scope in order to give a real answer. Let us start with emphasising our party's political tactical approach to the Kurdish national question and the struggle in Kurdistan. This is determined by the idea of unconditionally defending the right of the Kurdish nation to self-determination, up to and including the right to separate and to establish an independent state. We believe that national liberation has its real meaning in the emancipation of the people.

The founders, owners and the defenders of the statute which conferred the status of national slavery on Kurdistan are the classes and political powers which at the same time constitute major barriers for the Kurdish nation to exercise self-determination. That is, the imperialist states, the Turkish ruling classes, the Kurdish bourgeois-feudal classes and the political powers and apparatus that represent these classes and the interests of imperialism.

The solution to the Kurdish national question and the real achievement of national freedom of the Kurdish nation is directly linked to demolishing and dissolving the hegemony of Turkish and Kurdish reaction, of smashing the state, other forces and institutions which are the devices of this hegemony in Kurdistan. Consequently, the basic platform of our party seeks to extend the national aspirations and struggle of the Kurdish nation to a struggle against imperialism and the hegemony of the Turkish and Kurdish collaborator ruling classes. It must also encompass the emancipation of the working class and the peasantry (the people).

Our party has a special political platform (a tactical political plan) regarding the Kurdish national question and the struggle in Kurdistan. This platform formulates the national (democratic) aspirations of the Kurdish people and the necessary minimum democratic conditions to realise these aspirations. It links them with state power (namely, dissolving the state power organs and apparatus of the dictatorship in Kurdistan and the emergence of the primary conditions of the people's power). This political platform also constitutes a stage in transforming the present struggle and resistance of the Kurdish nation into the direct struggle for power. Alternatively, this platform itself may lead to power by the process of its self-extension in the struggle.

These are the specific elements of our party's political platform on the Kurdish national liberation struggle:

a) The unconditional recognition of the right of the Kurdish nation to establish an independent state. The public repudiation by the central parliament and the government of any rights or authority in Kurdistan. The abolition of the Kurdistan Governership. The dissolution of the state bureaucracy in Kurdistan. The immediate withdrawal of the military troops and the police organisation. The disarming of the Kurdish land owners and the tribal chief's families, the dispersal of the village-guards system and the handing over of their arms to the local national organs which will be set up by the Kurdish people.

b) The announcement of the international military and political agreements signed by the Republic of Turkey and the central government to be null and void in Kurdistan. The removal of the imperialist bases in Kurdistan. The withdrawal of the foreign military and diplomatic personnel and the announcement that the security of Kurdistan is a matter for the authority of the Kurdish people alone.

c) The handover of industrial state enterprises, machineries and all "public" institutions dealing with education, health, communication, transport, etc. to the national people's organs constituted by the Kurdish people (without any damage).

d) The establishment of the national democratic people's organs in every residential district in Kurdistan to take over temporary administration. The recognition of freedom of the people to organise to struggle politically and to determine their political destiny through a referendum held under these conditions.

That is the actual political platform on which our party's work is based in Kurdistan. This platform can incorporate the confiscation of the property of the collaborator feudal-bourgeois classes and the demands of the working class and labouring people for jobs, bread, land and (class based) freedom. This depends on the expansion and consolidation of the essential features of the open mass struggle and on the oppressed and oppressing classes in the Kurdish nation defining their inter-relationship more sharply. This is because this political platform is a tactical action plan which aims to make the Kurdish national question a part of the general struggle of the working class and people for democracy and to facilitate a revolutionary solution. More precisely, this platform is a tactical action programme which aims to expand the national struggle for freedom. It is designed to disperse the political power apparatus of the Turkish and Kurdish bourgeoisie and reaction which along with that of imperialism has the hegemony in Kurdistan. It aims to facilitate the Kurdish people becoming directly involved in the struggle and in organising for the struggle.

However, our party's work in Kurdistan does not consist only of the work that is being carried out on this tactical platform. The central link of our party's work in Kurdistan is the fundamental task of preparing and organising the working class for socialism and the people for revolution and of expanding the national liberation struggle to the emancipation of the people (workers-peasants revolution). Our party's tactical platform on the Kurdish question is, in a true sense, the practical (political) basis for realising these fundamental tasks and at the same time a basic platform of struggle which has links with other activities. We think there is no need to explain that none of the fundamental tasks of revolution and socialism can be realised or revolutionary and socialist activity undertaken without a political struggle, without taking part in the actual struggle of the masses, without organising activities to advance these struggles and without solving problems.

Undoubtedly, our party's work on the Kurdish question cannot be limited to the work of our Kurdistan Organisation in Kurdistan. One of the most significant tasks of our party organisations in Turkey is to make the workers and labourers of Turkish nationality, of the oppressing nation, to make the Kurdish question and the above mentioned platform their own. We fight to mobilise them for the right of freedom of the Kurdish people. Our party, which is the organisation of the workers of the Turkish and Kurdish nationalities, treats the question of the national liberation of the Kurdish people as a problem for the Turkish workers and labourers rather than simply Kurdish alone. Therefore it has a line which gives great importance to internationalist education and action of the workers and labourers who belong to the oppressing nation. Our party knows that it is not possible for the working class movement in Turkey to become a political movement unless, beside other things, the working class -which is ethnically Turkish in the majority- learn to defend the right of the Kurdish nation to establish an independent state.

As it can be understood from the point of view we stated, our party considers the question of national liberation of the Kurdish people as a significant question of the general struggle of the working class and the people for democracy. Our party has a line that places at the centre of its activities the transformation of the struggle for national liberation into a struggle against imperialism and reaction, the expansion of this struggle to a workers-peasants' (popular) revolution and the solution of the liberation struggle by revolutionary-democratic people's power. However, we want to stress that having such a line does not imply that our party would not support a national liberation movement which is not characterised by the fight for a workers-peasants' (popular) revolution.

Despite the fact that in our era the oppressed nations are represented mainly by the working class, peasantry and other oppressed classes and strata, the possibility of the emergence of a national movement with the leadership of the bourgeoisie or feudal-bourgeois strata of the oppressed nations is not yet disappeared entirely. This phenomenon is proved by the tendency of an increasingly growing section of the Kurdish ruling classes in Kurdistan to join the national ferment and to shape it as a movement under its own class hegemony. Moreover, the present national conflicts in the world show that the reactionary ruling classes of the oppressed nations have the possibility of dominating national movements, even though temporarily.

The attitude of our party towards national movements, which strike blows against imperialism in this or that way, is to support them, but without abstaining from criticising them. Our party, however, opposes the suppression of national movement and uprisings by the oppressing nation, irrespective of whether they have bourgeois or reactionary leadership, or even if they are dependent on this or that imperialist country. It has the policy of struggling against the suppressing forces. Our party considers the right of oppressed nations to self-determination and the freedom of separation as an unconditional and absolute right, irrespective of how this freedom is used. This general attitude of our party towards the liberation movement of the oppressed nation is and will continue to be valid also for the national movements which may emerge in Kurdistan with such characteristics.

However, it is necessary for our party to stress that we are not the party of the workers of other nationalities but of the working class of the Turkish and Kurdish nationalities. Its policy on the Kurdish national question and its work in Kurdistan never takes shape as "supporting" the progressive national movement and of "opposing" the suppression of the reactionary one. The basic policy of our party, as we have indicated before, is to end the influence of the exploiting and compromising classes of the oppressed nation on the national movement. It is designed to isolate these forces and to struggle for the expansion of the movement into a workers-peasants' (popular) revolution and for the development of this movement as a national movement led by the working class. Our political platform on the Kurdish national question that we have outlined above and our party's work among the working class and the people regarding other basic tasks of revolution and socialism, is the expression of this policy. This policy corresponds to the present conditions of the struggle.

OUR DIFFERENCES WITH PKK REGARDING POLITICAL AND ORGANISATIONAL WORK

In that answer, we generally outlined our party's attitude and actual policies towards the organisational and political unity of the working class from various nationalities and towards the solidarity and brotherhood of the peoples of the oppressed and oppressor nations. Having stressed that we do not have the possibility of reviewing these questions in detail, we will only point out our political and organisational differences with the Kurdish national movement.

1) The fundamental difference between our party and the Kurdish national movement, PKK (we understand from your question that you mean PKK), is on which political platform the movement will go forward on. Our party considers the question of the national liberty of the Kurdish people as a question of struggle against imperialism and the collaborator Turkish and Kurdish ruling classes. Consequently, the Kurdish nation cannot gain genuine national liberation without the victory of the struggle against imperialism and against the Turkish and Kurdish ruling classes which are the basis of imperialism in Kurdistan.

The Kurdish nation does not consist of a homogeneous mass and the working class masses have quite developed features. It has divided into peasantry -poor peasantry- and urban labourers strata. The Kurdish bourgeois, feudal-bourgeois class is the socio-political base of the hegemony of imperialism and Turkish reaction in Kurdistan and one expression of the present status of national slavery and the denial of national liberty.

This analysis is based on concrete phenomena and on the prospects created by economic and social development in Kurdistan. Consequently, our party has come to the conclusion that the question of national liberation is a question of revolutionary struggle against Kurdish and Turkish reaction and of emancipation of the working class and the people from imperialism and reaction. And the practical political platform we have outlined above is, in reality, a platform for the freeing of the struggle for national liberty from the influence of the Kurdish ruling classes. It is for its expansion to a workers-peasants' revolution and transformation into a struggle against imperialism and Turkish and Kurdish reaction. The fundamental difference between PKK and our party is illustrated by this point.

As we have pointed out before, the PKK's line before 1980 was formulated around the idea of an "independent Kurdistan". Certainly, this line generally excluded the fact that Kurdish society is divided into enemy classes whose interests are contradictory and that imperialism is the fundamental base of the status-quo in Kurdistan. However, it was a line which more or less encouraged a struggle against the Turkish state that was constituting one of the main barriers against an "independent Kurdistan" and against Western imperialism behind it. Nor was it based on the socio-economic objective condition of Turkey-Kurdistan that we have indicated previously. Essentially it was inspired by national sentiments in Kurdistan which were awakened by the political impact of the Kurdish movement in Iraq-Kurdistan. It was, on the other hand, based on the political conjunction created by the struggle of the Soviet Union for super power hegemony in the Middle-East and internationally.

The PKK started an open struggle against the hegemony of Turkey in Kurdistan in the mid-1980s with the slogan for an "independent Kurdistan". This period constituted the beginning of a process of transformation that we can call a dual orientation in PKK's line. One element of this transformation brought it closer to the people and reflected the sentiments of the Kurdish people against national oppression and their desire to struggle. This reflects itself in PKK's revolutionary action and warfare that it started to wage against the oppression of the dictatorship on the Kurdish people.

The other element, however, reflected itself, from the beginning, in its harmful indiscriminate terrorist actions and in its reticence to enlighten the people about their national and class desires and aspirations and to organise them so that they can realise self-determination. This, consequently, caused PKK to distance itself from the people and, in the last few years, reflected itself in the tendency that evolved towards reproachment with the Kurdish bourgeois-feudal classes and the courting of imperialist governments. This conciliatory "second tendency" has grown and is seen in PKK's work and line. Its growth has narrowed and weakened the revolutionary tendency we call the "first direction" in its work and action.

What is the significance of these interpenetrated dual tendencies which have been observed developing together in PKK's line and work since the mid-1980s? The significance of this, we can say, is that PKK has suspended the slogan for an "independent Kurdistan" and has dropped the policy determined by this slogan. It is forming a line that gives priority to "unity" with Turkey and re-evaluates, in this new context, the component parts of Kurdistan in other countries. We also suggest that the slogan for an "independent Kurdistan" is not completely exclusive to any one class, despite the fact that it has different meanings in different circumstances for the working class and the people.

The new circumstances of Turkey-Kurdistan were brought to light by international and regional developments. These happened simultaneously with the process of the dispersion of the Soviet Union, in the aftermath of the Iran-Iraq war and during the Gulf war. Particularly important also was the national ferment in Turkey-Kurdistan, the development of which was aiding by the activities of the PKK. These developments have destroyed the political lines of all other political forces in the region and made irrelevant the previous political line of PKK. PKK is moving towards a revised line by modifying its demands. It is doing this because it has realised the supremacy of Turkey-Kurdistan over other Kurdistan regions, the importance it has gained for the interests of the big powers and for the political conflicts in the Middle-East and the new "opportunities" for a "Turkish-Kurdish federation" presented by the economic and political unity of Turkey and Kurdistan. It has developed policies such as "federation", "federal solution", "recognition of the Kurdish identity" and "political solution". It has strengthened its tendency to prioritise establishing links with big Western governments and stepped up its search for allies amongst the "parliamentarian" political circles. All these developments are the political consequences of PKK's new orientation which has become explicit over the last few years.

PKK, on the one hand, use the word "popular revolution" and contribute, to a certain extent, to the development of this by its work and action. On the other hand, it makes the Kurdish national movement a tool of the bourgeoisie by the type of orientation and work we have outlined above. Thus, its platform is characterised by contradictions and uncertainties created by this position. Therefore, it is true to say that PKK has a line which is in the process of being "renewed" and which has not yet become clear or reached its conclusion.

Finally, PKK's struggle is increasingly changing from a struggle for popular revolution mobilised on its previous slogan of an "independent Kurdistan" (that is, from opposing the hegemony of Turkey in Kurdistan) into a struggle restricted to opposition to the present unequal political and legal form of the national status of Turkey-Kurdistan. Therefore, it is an undeniable fact that the further development of the struggle in this form would serve the political interests of the Kurdish bourgeois-feudal strata which are trying to reach a new settlement with the Turkish bourgeoisie. To realise these ends, they are making use of the popular movement in Kurdistan and lobbying for the support of imperialist governments.

If we come back to the question of the differences between our party's political platform and the PKK's, obviously these differences primarily concern PKK's tendency to shift the basis of the Kurdish national question from a platform of popular revolution to an attempt by the Kurdish bourgeoisie to make a new agreement with the Turkish ruling classes. Despite the fact that the Kurdish national movement must target imperialism, PKK's platform is increasingly shifting towards making "allies" with imperialist countries, with the Kurdish bourgeois-feudal classes and strata and with Turkish reaction which occasionally claims to be for the "recognition of the Kurdish identity" and "a federal system". This platform constitutes the fundamental political difference between us and represents as well as a potential impasse for PKK. Its political difference with our party reflects itself in its approach to the problems of the working and labouring classes, the forms of struggle, the extent of the participation of the labouring classes in revolution and the identification of the allies of the movement.

The circles defending PKK and its policy proclaim that these policies -such as "seeking international support", "the recognition of the Kurdish identity", "a political solution", "a federal system" and even "HEP" (People's Labour Party) and "parliamentarian opposition"- are not changes to its general line but simply tactical shifts. They also claim that these are "revolutionary tactics". Is this true? Are these policies an exersize in "revolutionary tactics"? In our party's opinion, such "defences" are not correct. A political tactic for a revolutionary party is a merging of its political plans and initiatives. A tactic must, first of all, promote and widen the movement of the classes and strata it is advanced on behalf of. It must increase their possibilities and organise their forces. On the other hand, it should restrict the possibilities of the enemy, beat back their offensives and, in general, bring the movement near to its strategic targets. Tactical policies are determined by the relation between the balance of strength between revolution/ counter revolution and the overall strategic aim. They play a determining role in the outcome of the struggle between revolution and counter revolution, if the organisation formulating these tactics is characterised by mass movement.

But what is the impact of PKK tactics such as the calls for "recognition of the Kurdish identity", "a federal solution", "a political solution" and "the unity of the Kurds" on the direction of the Kurdish national movement? The present situation in regards to the Kurdish question is as follows: On the one hand, the spontaneous dynamic and potential of the Kurdish popular movement has continued to improve in the last couple of years. However, the influence of the socially isolated Kurdish bourgeois-feudal circles on the people has entered a new period of expansion. The "parliamentarian" illusions of the Kurdish labouring masses have risen and succeeded in organising to a significant extent in the national struggle. Turkish reaction has obtained an area for manoeuvre, the opportunity to form a new "consensus" in its ranks and to expand Turkish chauvinism as a current with a mass base. On the other hand, a tendency of demoralisation and hopelessness has arisen among the Kurdish labouring masses. Consequently, its organisation and movement have not expanded. These phenomena cannot be ignored and PKK's "tactical policies" have had a great role in these negative developments.

We must state the interests of the Turkish and Kurdish bourgeoisie in Kurdistan and partially outline the inevitable orientation determined by these interests. This will make clear the true content of these PKK "tactics" and the position of the Kurdish bourgeois-feudal classes, especially of their most "modern" sections, towards the Kurdish national movement.

As we have stated in the first part of our answer, the popular movement in Kurdistan is also threatening the hegemony of the Kurdish bourgeoisie in that area. The Kurdish semi-feudal bourgeoisie has succeeded in making a 70-year-old agreement with the Turkish bourgeoisie based on the slavery of the Kurdish people. However, their moral authority over the Kurdish labouring masses has suffered heavy blows in the last few years.

The same popular movement, however, has played a significant role in exposing the economic and political superiority of Turkey-Kurdistan over all other Kurdish regions, the "possibilities" presented by this superiority for the Kurdish bourgeoisie and the great importance it has gained for Turkish bourgeois reaction and the imperialist countries. This movement was also instrumental in ensuring that all these facts were recognised by the forces in the region.

The "modernised" sections of the Kurdish bourgeoisie, seeing that their hegemony in Kurdistan is in danger, have emerged as an "opposition" to the revolutionary advance of the Kurdish popular movement, with the slogans "cultural-ethnic rights", "human rights" and "the recognition of the Kurdish identity". On the other hand, the Turkish bourgeoisie, which has made use of the "traditional" sections of the Kurdish ruling classes as a strike force and armed them against the Kurdish people and PKK, has accepted and even encouraged the "modern" opposition both for their immediate needs and their long term interests. It is an undeniable fact that this attitude of the Turkish bourgeoisie and reaction corresponds to the interests of Turkey in Kurdistan and in the Middle-East generally.

Firstly, they know that one of the fundamental pillars of their hegemony in Kurdistan is the Kurdish ruling classes.

Secondly, they see that the Turkish and Kurdish economies constitute a whole and the interests of their bourgeoisies are identical. They also believe that the Kurdish bourgeoisie cannot take a separatist stance unless the inter-imperialist relations of competition and the struggle for hegemony present greater opportunities for them in the Middle-East.

Thirdly, thanks to the authority that the Kurdish bourgeois-feudal circles can establish over the Kurdish people -even though temporarily and based on both armed terror and the reformist "opposition"- Turkey can interfere in the Kurdish question in the Middle-East and the internal affairs of other countries. Thus, it can become both a more "respected" country in the eyes of world "public opinion" and the real owner of Kurdistan regions.

Undoubtedly, this orientation of the Turkish bourgeoisie to "get rid of" the Kurdish question corresponds to the interests of the ruling classes in Turkey-Kurdistan. This is because the way of Kurdish reaction protecting their interests of economic and political hegemony and obtaining new spheres of influence in other Kurdistan regions is tied to securing a new agreement with the Turkish ruling classes.

Furthermore, armed Kurdish reaction and the reformist Kurdish bourgeois "opposition" have, in essence, the same position and the same ends -that is to block the revolutionary advance of the popular movement in Kurdistan and the threat posed by it to their hegemony. This is because Kurdish reaction, with its adjunct reformists and fascists, realises the advantages and possibilities before it, as well as the depth of the "impasse" it is in. The objective of Kurdish reaction is to suppress the Kurdish popular movement, to subordinate it (thus winning the support of imperialism) and to pressurise the Turkish bourgeoisie so as to obtain greater interests.

It is clear that the policies of the Turkish bourgeoisie such as "economic development", "South-East Anatolia Project" (a complex of irrigation tunnels, dams, hydroelectric power plants, etc.), "recognition of cultural-ethnic identity", "a federal system", "freedom of language", etc. are being developed through the growing influence of the Kurdish bourgeoisie and the renewal of its authority over a deceived people. This is despite the fact that these policies have been put on the agenda by the struggles of the Kurdish people themselves. These policies do not have any other meaning.

No one should be misled by the present "indecision" of the Turkish bourgeoisie on these policies and the "divided" position of the Kurdish ruling classes. No one should be fooled either by those sections of the Turkish bourgeoisie which are tending towards a "federation" or by the Kurdish "opposition" carried out by the sections of the Kurdish bourgeoisie which are, in reality, the most "Kemalist".

In the present conditions of the Middle-East and Kurdistan, the Turkish and Kurdish ruling classes are tightly tied to each other by their present interests and by the new regional "potential" interests. When the Turkish bourgeoisie succeeds in taking Kurdistan under its control, even partially, and the Kurdish bourgeoisie has authority in Kurdistan, they both will get the opportunity to make a new "agreement" based on this or that "political-legal" status according to the emerging balance of power. This holds true unless, in this process, the imperialist conflict for hegemony and rivalry creates more significant possibilities for the Kurdish bourgeoisie. Thus, the Kurdish question will, independently of the intentions of the protagonists, become a question through which Turkey would assert "territorial rights" in the region.

It is an undeniable fact that the Kurdish bourgeois "opposition" is one of the most significant aces up the sleeve of Turkish reaction. The only possibility to block development in this direction is for the working class and people's movement in Turkey and Kurdistan to advance the struggle against imperialism and against Turkish and Kurdish reaction by isolating the parliamentarian and compromising "oppositions". Countries like Iraq, Iran and Syria and reactionary individuals like Barzani and Talabani have already realised Turkey's new expansionist ambitions (and its methods). These became more clear especially just before the Gulf war. Let us also state that this ambition, contrary to what most people claim, is not limited to the oil in Kerkük. Therefore, these countries have tended to revise their policies and are aiming to "protect" themselves from Turkey-Kurdistan, an area they previously had a policy of "provocation" towards. This is due to both the possibilities created for the Turkish and Kurdish bourgeoisie by Turkey-Kurdistan and their fear of the revolutionary influence that the struggle in the region may cause.

The "leftist" and parliamentarianist Kurdish bourgeoisie, which a few years ago was faced with a loss of authority over the Kurdish people, has begun a process of re-establishing this authority over the workers and labourers. One can not deny that the impact on labouring people created by PKK's "election tactics" and its calls for "political solution" and "federal solution" partially accounted for this. While the Turkish government and government-armed Kurdish reaction are trying to destroy PKK, the reformist and parliamentarianist Kurdish bourgeoisie is trying to strengthen itself by making use of PKK, to subordinate it, to pull it towards reformism and to absorb it. The political tendencies of PKK that we have outlined above have a tactical significance. However, tactics are also, in the final analysis, a part of a strategy which is in harmony with the interests of this or that class. Thus, independently of the wishes of PKK, its tactics, in reality, have a strategic meaning which serve the interests of the new agreement that the Kurdish bourgeoisie is seeking to make with the Turkish bourgeoisie. No matter what PKK says and what objectives it has, its tactics correspond to the demands and desires of the Kurdish bourgeoisie and the policy of a "Kurdish bourgeois solution".

Let us take as a last example PKK's policy put forward under the slogans of "federal solution", "federation" or "political solution". With the present balance of power between revolution and counter revolution, which social classes and political forces did this tactical call and initiative serve? Which forces did it aid to grow, to increase their influence and to widen their possibilities?

What the facts show is this: The Kurdish "reformist" bourgeoisie, which has launched a new campaign with the formation of HEP (People's Labour Party) and with the elections, has obtained new opportunities to deceive the Kurdish people and spread illusions about the dictatorship and the government. Turkish reaction and the government have also obtained advantages in preparing their new attacks, and the arena for "dialogue" between the Turkish and Kurdish bourgeoisie has widened. This, along with the impact of the other parliamentarianist calls and tactics, has hampered the development of the open mass movement. This fact cannot be denied.

Let us assume that the government agreed with the PKK on a "federal" or "political" solution. Could PKK establish a "Turkish-Kurdish federation" with the Turkish state on behalf of the Kurdish people? Or could a call of PKK or of other revolutionary forces be a spark for a revolt of the labouring masses of Kurdistan, let alone Turkey, if Turkish reaction rejected the PKK's conditions of "federation"?

It is evident that it is not possible to give a positive answer to these questions by pointing to any concrete data. Whatever angle it is looked at, it is quite obvious that such PKK policies and its other reformist stances are serving the interests of the Kurdish bourgeoisie and the attempts to stitch up a deal between those sections of the Turkish bourgeoisie who are anxious to speed up the process of "solution" and the Kurdish bourgeoisie. Such policies facilitate the "political stability" that the bourgeoisie and reaction seek in Turkey and Kurdistan. Yet the rise of the open mass revolutionary movement in Turkey and Kurdistan and its success imply the deepening of political instability and vice-versa. The traditional currents of bourgeois socialism "elaborate" the theory and the politics of "socialism" and "revolution" by protecting "stability" in Turkey. The reason why they noisily support and "quietly encourage" such PKK policies is because these policies ease the agreement that the Turkish and Kurdish ruling classes have been trying to make against the interests of the Kurdish people, and consequently facilitate "political stability".

From what we have pointed out here, one should not conclude that our party is one which has become "short-sighted" with a crude "left" understanding and tactical approach. In our opinion, calls for a "political solution" can be made when the conditions are conducive, as a political element of the attack against the dictatorship. We think that such tactical calls and initiatives can be made to promote the offensive plan of revolution, to cause the counter revolutionary front to collapse completely and to prepare the masses for a direct mobilisation for revolution. This occurs when the political situation is definitely in favour of revolution, when counter revolution's room for manoeuvre is exhausted, it is unable to mobilise its forces and compromising forces are isolated. It is quite clear for our party that the calls and attempts at a "political solution", in adverse conditions, play into the hands of the bourgeoisie and reaction. This is proved by the facts.

Lastly, let us emphasise that if PKK is to achieve the popular revolution it often talks of, it first has to abandon the policies which promote "the unity of the Kurds" vis-a-vis Turkish reaction's policy of "national unity". This is because under the conditions of capitalism and reaction the policy of "the unity of the Kurds" is a policy of the Kurdish bourgeoisie. This is because the Kurdish nation is not a unified whole. It consists of contradictory classes, the exploited and the exploiting classes. In other words, those who are against imperialism and reaction and those whose interests are in line with imperialism and reaction. The real possibilities for the national liberation of the Kurdish nation lie with the struggle of the Kurdish people against imperialism and reaction. The Kurdish national movement represents a potential revolutionary possibility against imperialism and all shades of reaction.

What is revealed by the massive national stirring in Kurdistan is not only the fact that Turkey-Kurdistan has gained a great economic and political significance in the Middle-East and that this presented new "opportunities" and "possibilities" for the Kurdish bourgeoisie. It is not even that some facts have come to the light, which "facilitate" the new "agreement" which is being sought by the reactionary bourgeoisies of both nationalities through denying the right of the Kurdish people to liberation. The main fact illustrated by the national awakening in Kurdistan is that the working class and the labouring people represent the true liberation of the Kurdish nation. It is also that, compared with other Kurdish regions, there are more mature possibilities for the unity of the working class and the labourers of both nations against imperialism and against Turkish and Kurdish reaction. This is the definite superiority of Turkey-Kurdistan compared with other Kurdistan regions. Crucially, the working class is more advanced than those in other Kurdish regions and the social force which will determine everything in Kurdistan is not the Kurdish bourgeoisie or reaction or simply any labouring classes, but the working class.

These are facts. But will they be utilised for the true liberation of the Kurdish nation and for revolution? Our party's political platform on the Kurdish national question and its ongoing work are based on these concrete facts. A genuine national liberation of the oppressed Kurdish nation is not possible unless the demands of the working class and the labouring classes for democracy and freedom are taken up by the Kurdish people, unless the labouring masses are organised around these demands and unless the working class and the toiling peasantry take their destiny into their own hands. The possibility of a genuine popular revolution lies in this. That is the political conclusion our party has drawn from the phenomena that are manifest in Kurdistan, from the relations between the political forces in the region that are in the process of being refashioned and from the facts that have been strikingly proved by the struggle between the oppressed and the oppressing classes.

2) Another significant difference between our party and PKK is on the question of the forms of struggle, organisation of the popular masses and the role of the masses in revolution.

Revolution is the work of the masses and every revolution is characterised by the name of the class or classes that stamp their own demands on it. For a revolution to be a revolution of the working class and people, simply the participation of the working class and the people (even in relatively large numbers) is not sufficient. It requires the labouring classes that constitute the people, mainly the working class, to be conscious and organised so that they can stamp the revolution with their own independent demands. Unless this happens, a revolution which triumphs by the efforts of millions of workers and labourers can not be prevented from remaining as "revolution" of that section of the bourgeoisie that has gained hegemony. The role of the workers and labouring masses in such a "revolution" is reduced to that of being a supplementary force and a prop for the bourgeoisie. This means that revolution is not only the work of the masses but of the masses which have emerged with their own independent demands, which struggle for these demands and which characterise the revolution by organising independently in the struggle.

The difference between our party and PKK on the understanding of revolution and the political platform for Kurdistan, also inevitably reveals itself on the question of the position of the masses in the struggle, their organisation and of forms of struggle and organisation. Without going into details let us emphasise that when the role of the masses in revolution is understood in a way that links it to different classes, then the political slogans and demands put forward will inevitably be of a different character. At the same time, the participation and organisation of the workers and labouring classes in the struggle will be treated in a different way.

Our party takes the mass struggle as its starting point. The main content of our line is to enlighten the workers and labouring masses in the mass struggle, to organise them and to ensure that, as an organised force, their demands become the demands of the struggle. Our party characterises the process of the advance of the workers and labouring masses' movement as follows: As a general rule, the mass struggle, which begins on economic problems and partial demands of the workers and labouring masses, develops in ebbs and flows, in defeats and advances. It develops in the forms of strikes, actions of resistance, general strikes, general resistances, demonstrations and armed demonstrations . This is organically linked with the masses increasingly putting forward more definitive demands and comprehending political slogans. Then, when the conditions are ripe, it turns into revolution through local and general uprisings and armed revolts. At the same time, the development of the process of mass struggle and of revolution is that of workers and labouring masses gaining political consciousness and organising. In general, the workers and labourers first enter the struggle by coming together in primitive and weak (spontaneous) organisations and thanks to the knowledge and experience that they gain in the struggle they advance and broaden their involvement in the organisation. When it comes to this aspect of the question, what has a determining importance is the revolutionary work of a party (or parties) representing the workers and labouring masses and the character of the line directing this work.

The national liberation struggle of the Kurdish people is developing in line with the general development of revolution. If we leave to one side the temporary morale stagnation that has partially been felt since the last election, the mass struggle is advancing and spreading in Kurdistan, even though through ebbs and flows, advances and retreats. However, the Kurdish popular movement will inevitably destroy its own possibilities and dynamics. Although the energy and potential created by the mass struggle itself continues, it is an undeniable fact that the open mass action does not fully reflect the level of the disillusionment of the masses with the system, their anger against the dictatorship and their desire for struggle. One of the reason for this is the centuries-old illiteracy, lack of consciousness and disorganisation the Kurdish people has been subjected to. The other reason is directly linked to the character of the slogans formulated by the organisations which work amongst the people, which are -to varying degrees- recognised by advanced sections of the masses and with the type of action and organisation they insist on. (The reason why we do not say "the organisation" but "organisations" is that in addition to PKK, one cannot ignore the reformist Kurdish bourgeois circles. These are both in contact and in rivalry with PKK and are increasing their influence among the people through the work of their various fractions.)

We have already mentioned the common class character of the political platforms and slogans of the nationalist Kurdish groups and organisations. Here, we will only speak of PKK's understanding of the participation of the masses in revolution, its organisation and its forms of struggle. We believe that this will summarise the main elements of our views on almost all these groups and organisations. However, we think that it is easier to emphasise the understanding and approach of our party on these questions before we come to a general understanding of PKK.

When our party advocates the idea that "revolution is the work of the masses", the thing we are advocating in reality is the line of mass struggle. In other words, that the path of revolution goes through mass struggle. Our party's concrete slogans of struggle, its calls for action (i.e., the forms of struggle), its tactical organisational slogans (the form of the organisation) and its daily political and organisational work on this basis are dictated by the level that the mass movement has reached. They are linked to advancing the mass movement and to broadening the organisation of the masses. In our party's opinion, revolution will take place with the transformation of the forward movement of the mass struggle into uprisings and general armed revolts. For revolution (for instance in Kurdistan) to be a genuinely popular one, it is necessary for the classes and strata which constitute the popular masses to take part in revolution conscious of their own class demands. Also, they must unite within the organisation that shapes this struggle and gives them the power to conduct it.

Since the second half of the 1980s, it has become increasingly obvious that, despite its heavily spontaneous character, the dimensions of the mass struggle in Kurdistan have generally developed in more advanced forms than in Turkey. Of course, there is a contradiction between the level of the mass struggle in Kurdistan and the sporadic nature and relatively low level of open mass action. However, the progress of the movement in general, the characteristics it has acquired and the problems it is faced with have, for some time, put on the agenda of the working and labouring masses guerrilla warfare and guerrilla organisation. This is a difference to the struggle in Turkey.

Guerrilla warfare and organisation is a tactical form of struggle and organisation, linked with the organisation of the masses. Furthermore, guerrilla war is a struggle which develops as an action of armed organisations come together in small groups. However, it is not a war waged by revolutionary and pre-eminent "vanguards", but a form of war waged by the armed masses. In the same way, guerrilla organisation is a form of organisation that is constituted by the armed and potentially armed masses. This understanding is also valid in Kurdistan.

Guerrilla organisation and struggle is correct as long as it serves the interests and development of the mass struggle and the organisation of the Kurdish people. It is necessary as long as it serves the progress and expansion of this struggle and organisation. This means that guerrilla war and organisation is a valid form as long as it weakens the influence and force of the dictatorship in Kurdistan. It must also serve to expand and consolidate the open mass movement of the Kurdish people. It must enable all kinds of organisations of the workers and labourers to advance and increasingly embrace new masses. It must speed up the process of the transition of the popular movement towards armed revolts against the dictatorship. Also, of its organisations into forms which will lead this revolt.

NATIONAL POPULAR COMMITTEES

The facts show which forms of struggle and organisation the mass struggle in Kurdistan throws up today. Although the conditions in the region are determined by sharp clashes, the struggle in Kurdistan has been conducted in all forms -from the most mundane in open and legal areas created by the mass struggle, to protest demonstrations, legal / illegal strikes, resistance and armed street demonstrations. All these retain their validity today. It is also well-known that when the workers' movement in Turkey is on the rise and general strike and resistance is on the agenda, the orientation towards general resistance grows stronger in Kurdistan also, alongside that in Turkey. Previous experience also shows that in some circumstances even local uprisings can be expected when the anger generated by clashes between the dictatorship and the people explodes.

Despite everything taking place in Kurdistan, in the forthcoming period it is very important not to ignore the following possibilities: Large scale street clashes may take place as a result of a clash of some material and moral factors at an appropriate moment. Despite difficulties and increasing negative developments, at such moments, local uprisings may emerge. Also, when the working class movement in Turkey influences the Kurdish working class at a time when a wave of the workers' movement brings a general strike and struggle onto the agenda, corresponding actions in Kurdistan may be precipitated. Despite last year's negative developments, this can be expected in Kurdistan. Therefore, a revolutionary party has to take such phenomena into consideration when issuing its calls for struggle and action and conducts its agitational work.

Guerrilla warfare, as a form of struggle, only has real meaning in this context. It becomes meaningful when it emerges alongside the mass struggle in this way and when it is determined by the interests of this struggle. Despite the demoralisation and weariness evident among the masses, especially since Newroz, and the fact that a concrete prediction on what kinds of developments will take place in the future is not possible, there are no fundamental changes in Kurdistan which greatly alter slogans and calls for action. For this reason, a guerrilla war which is organically linked to the interests of the mass struggle maintains its validity in Kurdistan.

Forms of organisation exist in which the workers and labouring masses take part or tend to take part and which have gained validity. These forms are appropriate for the struggles required by this period. Like the forms of struggle, organisational forms exist in the possibilities of mass struggle, in the organisation of the masses in struggle, in the "primitive" forms that shape the spontaneous movement and in the tendency of the labouring masses to organise. We are not here talking about the forms of organisation that are valid in all conditions such as trade unions, which are one of the main class organisations of the working class. Neither are we speaking of open or semi-open youth organisations or peasant cooperatives, etc. We are talking about the tactical and/or mass forms of organisation that have been created and made valid vehicles by the present stage of the mass struggle. The Kurdish peasants are organising around respected village leaders in their actions. The rural or town labourers are gathering via their protests around simple organisations, using as covers mukhtars and local administrators to whom they feel close. The young Kurdish labourers, when the wave of anger is high, temporarily use the system's political or cultural sub-organisations or traditional institutions as a simple shell for their national demands.

All these are embryos of the valid form of organisation in which the mass struggle will be shaped. These simple organisations cohere momentarily within the system's institutions, which they use as nothing more than a cover. They then disperse and die down with the end of the actions of resistance. However, it is obvious that they constitute the organisational form for illegal protests and for acts of resistance that confront the armed attacks of the dictatorship. It is not necessary here to state that PKK or another organisation is, to some extent, within or at the side of the mass movement in this form.

In our party's opinion, apart from the mass organisations which always retain validity and which should be formed today, the basic form of appropriate tactical-mass organisation is reflected in the organisations we have mentioned above. These have been created by the actions of the labouring masses in order to meet the needs of the present level of the mass struggle. When these primitive forms are systematised, the form of organisation that comes out of them is national popular (revolutionary) committees. This form is capable of uniting different labouring classes. This is one of the most significant characteristics of the organisational form of the movement in the present period. It can organise and mobilise these classes. It can unite the political content of the movement with the people. National popular committees take the form of mass organisations and they are able to centralise on the basis of residence in villages, neighbourhoods and districts of towns and cities. At a minimum, they are comprised of the conscious sections of every class and stratum that constitute the people. They must be formed with or at the same time as popular militia and with a political programme for Kurdistan which is similar to our party's. We see the embryo of this form of organisation in the primitive structures that have been spontaneously created by the Kurdish labourers as a means of struggle and which spontaneously disappear with the dispersion of resistance .

National popular committees can mean a peasant union for the peasantry. However, the workers, youth and the urban labourers can participate in them both in their residential areas and through their own mass organisations according to the development of the struggle. These committees can function as popular organisations which resist the offensives of the dictatorship, which are capable of embracing mass action and all forms of struggle including an uprising.

The political platform of these committees has to be the one that our party has developed for Kurdistan. It is a fact that the labourers fight with a desire for national liberation but they do not know how to get a genuine liberation. Therefore, a political platform shaped by our party's programme is a definite necessity for the transformation of their spontaneous national (in other words, bourgeois) consciousness into one with a populist and anti-imperialist content. The Kurdish workers and peasants are under the illusion that the difficulties they are faced with are explained by their national oppression. So, this platform is also necessary for them to realise the true content of national liberation, to put forward their class demands and to expand the struggle for national liberation into one against imperialism and reaction.

All this would also mean that the Kurdish workers and labourers would take their emancipation (and the liberation of the Kurdish people) into their own hands and increase hundred times their revolutionary initiative, their ability to struggle and organise. We can say that this is the fundamental condition and the chief opportunity for national revolution to turn into a genuine popular revolution.

Now, let us look at how the Communist Party, anti-imperialist and revolutionary parties and groups which are active in Kurdistan will join these organisations and how these organisations will conduct guerrilla warfare together with other forms of mass actions of the labourers and mass movement.

Communist and revolutionary parties and groups can take part in these popular organisations with the forces and masses they influence. They can fight to expand the actions of these organisations to embrace the type of revolutionary political platform that we have described above. They can also, by virtue of their base among labourers and youth, form their own organisations inside popular committees and work for influence. The one condition for the communist, revolutionary and anti-imperialist parties and groups to join national popular committees is for them to unite on the basis of an action programme similar to our party's political platform on the Kurdish question and for them to work responsibly to enlighten, mobilise and organise the people in these committees. This is also the main possibility for unity of the forces of revolution and people on a revolutionary basis.

In the present conditions in Kurdistan, this constitutes the possibility of the transformation of the national struggle into a genuine popular revolution. Also, this will prevent revolutionary energy from being wasted and help the process of unification of the revolutionary parties and currents in the form of a front. The revolutionary-democratic alliance of the revolutionary parties and groups within national popular committees based on a revolutionary political platform will be a significant step forward in the struggle to revolutionise and democratise other workers and labourers' organisations in Kurdistan. This will also provide a genuine political basis for solidarity from Turkey to the Kurdish people.

National popular organisations in the form of national revolutionary committees, with the participation of communist and revolutionary parties and groups, can unite the conscious revolutionary sections of the people and the less advanced Kurdish labourers who are discontent with reactionary fascist oppressions based on the denial of national liberation and even the existence of the Kurdish nation. These organisations are the main ones capable of mobilising and uniting the whole people in mass resistance and struggle. Also, they are popular organisations in which a genuine guerrilla war -that is immune from indiscriminate terrorist actions- can escalate as an element and a form of mass struggle with the aim to extend the political demands of the labouring masses and to organise them. Basically, popular militia and guerrilla organisations are constituted in them.

In the present conditions in Kurdistan, guerrilla warfare must be conducted linked to the interests of the resistence and organisation of the masses. It must be waged by means of guerrilla forces organised as standing detachments of these committees. Depending on the local and regional expansion of the popular movement and on the level of centralisation, guerrilla war must also be waged by means of developing mobile forces. In other words, it is a guerrilla warfare which is organised and then reorganised as an appropriate form of popular struggle and war and as an element of the massive political struggle and organisation of the people. That is the only way for the national liberation movement to isolate the bourgeois-feudal circles, to develop as a workers-peasants' movement, to direct the struggle against imperialism and reaction, and to move towards a genuine popular revolution. That is also the only way of rendering real assistance to the workers, peasants and labouring masses to take the freedom of the Kurdish nation and the liberation of the people into their own hands and to organise as an alternative political power. This is how our party approaches the Kurdish national question, the struggle and organisation of the Kurdish people and the role of the workers and labourers in popular revolution.

BRIEFLY ON PKK'S UNDERSTANDING OF FORMS OF STRUGGLE AND ORGANISATION

We can now return to analysing some of the main characteristics of PKK's forms of struggle and organisation, its policy and its approach to the role of the people in revolution. We can say that this understanding and practice is the mirror-opposite of our party's. We have already outlined PKK's political slogans and the "tactical" and "strategic" content of these slogans. First of all, PKK's understanding, practice and approach is clearly in "harmony" and is "consistent" with these pragmatic political slogans. However, this "harmony" and "consistency" is not a positive position for PKK. On the contrary, this constitutes the source of the fundamental contradictions that drag PKK onto the side of the Kurdish bourgeoisie.

What is the main origin of this position? Which elements of PKK's position aaccount for which policy? In which forms do the consequences of PKK policies and understanding turn into new reasons? These are not the questions we will discuss. What is the character of PKK's calls for struggle to the Kurdish people? What sorts of organisations does it present to the Kurdish workers, labourers and youth? And what is the role of the Kurdish people in revolution according to PKK's political and organisational work? That is the theme we will touch upon.

Obviously, there is a close relationship between the slogans of struggle of a political party and its calls for action and forms of organisation. The political content of PKK's calls for struggle and action is developing in the direction of "the unity of the Kurdish nation against the Republic of Turkey". As an expression of this unity, they advance "the recognition of cultural and national identity" and "paving" the way for a "federal-political solution". We can see that occasional calls for "serhildan" (uprising) and the guerrilla warfare that it advocates as a "fundamental" form of struggle are increasingly being linked to facilitating "the recognition of the Kurdish identity","the federal-political solution" and winning support for this solution of Kurdish and international public opinion -mainly the Kurdish bourgeoisie and Western governments. In its calls for struggle and the forms of struggle it advocates, there are no demands for jobs, wages, bread, land, trade union and political freedom against national oppression or against the exploiting Kurdish and Turkish feudal-bourgeois classes. Nor are there any calls for strikes, occupations, acts of resistance, general strike-general resistance, etc. through which the workers and labourers would educate themselves politically, take their emancipation into their own hands, improve their revolutionary initiative and develop their organisations.

Thus, the relationship of PKK's calls for struggle and its slogans for action to the struggle of the workers, labourers and the Kurdish people is quite clear. In other words, we can explicitly see the relationship between the "national awakening" of the Kurdish people and the "class inertia" of the working class and the oppressed classes in the slogans of the PKK. PKK aims to restrict the "national awakening" to a spontaneous (bourgeois) one. They want to see the "political solution" of the Kurdish national question via the "unity of the Kurds" involving the Kurdish bourgeoisie, some Western governments and those sections of the Turkish bourgeoisie with a tendency to recognise the "Kurdish identity" and a "federal-political solution". In facilitating such a solution, the role of the Kurdish workers and labouring classes is to be restricted to a parliamentarian-national struggle and to act as a social/political pressure group. No matter what PKK's intentions are and how they explain it, the objective meaning of its calls for struggle and its action slogans increasingly imply this. It is possible to see this in the Kurdish press and in PKK's publications, in its agitation, propaganda and organisational work.

The forms of organisation that PKK advocates for the Kurdish people and its organisational work among them are directly linked to the nature of its calls for struggle and the forms of struggle that we have stated above. We can say that PKK is organising the Kurdish people mainly in two ways: (i) to organise the masses that it has won from the Kurdish people and youth (we leave the party organisation aside) in guerrilla groups. Its objective is to turn the Kurdish people into an "army"; (ii) the parliamentarian-reformist organisation which thinks of a kind of "classless, homogeneous and united" nation on the political objectives we have outlined above. This is the significance of PKK's calls for parliamentarian organisation and of its actual organisational work for the Kurdish people.

Undoubtedly, these two organisational forms (guerrilla-army and parliamentarian) imply a definite type of socio-political organisation -the establishment of a "National Parliament". So, the "new" social/political organisation that PKK has suggested to Kurdish society is a national parliament unifying all Kurds -independently of them being bourgeois-feudal, worker or peasant. They are brought together as members of a Kurdish nation whose "interests are identical". Thus, while PKK wants some limited and formal changes to the "national status" of the Kurdish nation, this form of organisation actually means no changes to the present social/political structure of Kurdish society. This is because nowhere in PKK's political slogans and calls for struggle is there a demand which mobilises the working class, peasantry and other exploited classes and strata for their independent interests against imperialism, the bourgeoisie and semi-feudal reaction. Nor is there any call or work for an organisation designed to facilitate the masses gaining a consciousness of the need to broaden the scope of their actions and organisation to achieve a new populist social organisation of Kurdish society.

Kurdish society is not a primitive one not yet divided into classes. On the contrary, it is divided into, on the one side, the working class, peasantry and other labouring strata and, on the other, the bourgeois-feudal classes. Obviously, in such societies "national" organisation (with its army, parliament and culture) will be a vehicle for the "struggle" and hegemony of the bourgeoisie. This is because such "national" structure is not based on the unity of the workers and labouring classes against the bourgeois and reactionary classes and against imperialism.

This holds true even if the Kurdish people waged guerrilla war, if all the people became an "army" or the workers and labourers organised themselves as an "army". What is key is for which class or classes' political interests have the people "become an army"? What political objectives do they pursue as an "armed organisation" and what political demands dominate this "army"?

There are enough warning examples in the world that make explicit the nature and the contradiction of PKK's line of struggle and organisation and of the political and organisational work it is carrying out. One of them is the Turkish national liberation war and its national organisation. The Turkish and Kurdish workers and peasants were largely involved in this war as "guerrilla organisations" and as an "army". The Turkish and Kurdish people fought for "national liberation" rallied around the national parliament, which was directing this war "on behalf of the nation". This national parliament was not shy of promising land to the peasants and freedom to the people. Today, it is obvious both what the working class of Turkey and the Turkish and Kurdish peasants have gained from these promises and what the position of Turkey is. It is clear that the "national war" that was successful thanks to the armed struggle of the workers and peasants ended under the hegemony of the bourgeoisie.

It is an undeniable fact that the present position of the liberation war of the Palestinian people who have armed and formed a national organisation, parliament and government and of the uprising of the people of Iraq-Kurdistan who have fought for 30 years with arms in hands constitute warning examples for PKK. No one can suggest that these peoples had to submit to the "solution" of American imperialism because they did not "fight", "become an army" or because they could not succeed in forming a "national parliament". The peoples of Turkey, Palestine and Iraq-Kurdistan certainly did organise themselves as "guerrillas" and as an "army" and established their "national parliaments". The "national" and "anti-imperialist" war of the Turkish and Kurdish people "succeeded". However, the people could not escape from submitting to the hegemony of the bourgeois-feudal classes. Nor could the country escape from the domination of imperialism. The Palestinian people have waged "revolutionary" guerrilla warfare for decades. They had an "army" and a "national parliament". Moreover, they have been in "intifada" for years. However, the Palestinian people were inevitably disarmed and condemned by the submission of their "national parliament" to American imperialism. In this context, we hardly need to go into details about Iraq-Kurdistan.

These peoples have fought courageously for their national liberation. They even struggled against imperialism and reactionary forces (in contrast to PKK), became an "army" and constituted a "national parliament". So, why could they not escape from surrendering -at this or that stage of their struggle- to the bourgeois-feudal classes and imperialism? Why did the national resistance and national anti-imperialist uprisings in these countries not turn into popular revolutions?

In all these countries, national uprisings developed with the organisation of the workers and peasants as "guerrillas" and as an "army" and with the revitalisation of the "national parliaments" by the labouring people. In spite of this, the exploited classes and strata, in the end, had to submit to the hegemony of the bourgeois-feudal classes and of imperialism. This is because the national awakening of the working class, peasantry and other exploited classes and strata could not qualitatively develop into a struggle against bourgeois-capitalist oppression. The national consciousness of the people could not turn from spontaneous (bourgeois) consciousness into a populist and anti-imperialist one. Nor could the worker and peasant masses succeed in building an organisation and activity which would stamp the struggle with their own class demands and the imprint of their own massive class organisations. In other words, the working class and people could not take the national liberation, their own struggle and organisation into their hands and mould them with their own demands and methods.

To sum up, we can say that the main reason why national liberation remained incomplete and could not turn into a popular revolution was that the working class and peasantry could not escape from subordination to the "national" bourgeoisie. History has shown that "guerrillas" and "armies" that the ruling classes needed for their struggle for hegemony have always been composed of the oppressed classes.

There is nothing original in PKK's political platform, its call for struggle and action or in its forms of organisation. Obviously, leaving aside its readiness to compromise in certain conditions with a section of the Turkish bourgeoisie and the Western countries and to impede progress of the idea of independent Kurdistan, PKK is following the same general line as the above mentioned national movements -especially of Kemal Atatürk and Arafat.

Let us analyse PKK's organisational work among the Kurdish people. PKK isolates from the masses the young and energetic forces that it has won through its work. It takes the majority of them to the mountains to make them guerrillas. Others are organised in technical groups to provide logistical support, telecommunications and intelligence to these guerrillas. PKK sends other forces among the Kurdish people and tries to unite the workers and labourers as a Kurdish nation with the Kurdish bourgeois-feudal circles on their approved "national" platform. These circles consider "parliament as an arena for the solution of the Kurdish question". They do not put forward any demands apart from national-cultural autonomy. They want to make a new agreement with the Turkish bourgeoisie.

What PKK's political and organisational work does not involve is the education and mobilisation of the workers and labourers on the basis of their class demands for democracy, against imperialism, against the bourgeoisie and reactionary forces. It does not carry out any work to unite them in their own organisations and to ensure that they take full control of their organisations.

According to the understanding that directs PKK's work, everything depends on "guerilla organisation" and the "militarisation" of the people. The logic of this position can be clearly observed in mass actions in Kurdistan. Mass demonstrations are dispersed by the attacks of the dictatorship -or they disperse spontaneously as they are not under conscious ideological and political leadership. Under these conditions, mass demonstrations turn simply into clashes with the reactionary forces and fragment into small armed groups. Consequently, the mass actions and resistance are, in a sense, being used as a "tool", a "cause" for the armed forces of PKK to engage militarily with the dicatorship.

Therefore, PKK's understanding and practice of struggle does not consist of helping the people to be educated, organised and combatative. Instead, their perspective is of "fighting on behalf of the people" and keeping the workers and labourers in an auxiliary, supporting role in this fight. In fact, this is already having negative consequences, as is PKK's policy of restricting the workers and labourers to spontaneous national consciousness and parliamentary national organisation.

This was observed, as in many other cases, at the commemoration of Vedat Ayd›n who was murdered in Diyarbak›r and also in the ?›rnak incidents that were sparked by the provocation of the government. How did the Kurdish reformist-bourgeois circles succeed, despite PKK, in keeping the masses silent at the commemoration of Vedat Ayd›n? Why did the people of ?›rnak have to leave the town after the ?›rnak events? Is this mass exodus a revolutionary protest or a reflection of the political influence of the Kurdish reformist-bourgeoisie on the people?

These events and many others prove that when the masses are not conscious of their real interests and have not yet organised on the basis of these interests, they will perpetually be deceived and perhaps have to surrender. They also prove that the bourgeoisie and reactionary forces can subordinate popular masses who are disorganised or lacking in consciousness. PKK has to understand that armed organisations of the people, based on masses that are not organised or clear about their own class interests, can not be its "guerrillas" and "army". If it wants to continue to pursue popular revolution, it has to stop political-organisational work that sidelines the workers and labouring masses and leaves them under the influence of the Kurdish bourgeois-reformist circles. Objectively, this type of work strengthens the bourgeoisie.

Let us summarise what we have outlined thus far about PKK's understanding of revolution and forms of struggle and organisation, an understanding, we must remember, that is constantly mutating: PKK's understanding of revolution is not that of a popular revolution. It is increasingly changing into a revolution of the top strata and is becoming distant from any concept of popular revolution. Essentially, such an understanding of revolution is premised on the awakening of the workers and labouring masses to a spontaneously formed national consciousness. At the same time, it is based on their indifference and class antipathy to a genuine democratic (anti-imperialist, anti-feudal and anti-fascist) role. In any such a revolution, the working class and labouring masses would mainly be consigned to being a support and 'reserve army' for the bourgeois-feudal top strata.

PKK's political work is determined by perspectives such as "recognition of the Kurdish identity", "a federal-political solution" and "the unity of the Kurds". Its political work, its approach to forms of struggle and organisation is in a bad "harmony" with this understanding of revolution and with the role it assigns to the workers and labouring classes in revolution. Therefore, a popular revolution does not flow from such an understanding and from such political and organisational work. PKK's understanding, line and work -irrespective of its claims- is not geared towards popular revolution. Furthermore, it is obvious that it is not possible for a revolution to assume a popular form, unless the working class, as a class, participates at the centre of it and unless the revolutionary organisation is determined to work and organise within the working class as the basic focus of its work and organisation.

Why has PKK speeded up its tendency - which has existed in the past but become more pronounced in the last two years or so- to distance themselves from popular revolution and to approach bourgeois-feudal circles? This situation is explained by many things. "Tactical" concerns may be advanced as explanations. We believe that no explanation which does not take into account the relative significance of Turkey-Kurdistan can illustrate the true reasons of the "transformation" of PKK. The real reasons why PKK has speeded up its orientation away from the Kurdish people towards the Kurdish bourgeois-feudal circles lie in this and in the new opportunities and interests this development has prompted. That is, Turkey-Kurdistan has been recognised as having new importance in the Middle-East and in Kurdistan as a whole by the regional states and the world. This has created new possibilities and interests for the Kurdish bourgeoisie in Turkey, other Kurdistan regions in the Middle-East and vis-a-vis the big imperialist governments.

As was indicated above, Kurdistan has gained a new position in Turkey, in the Middle-East and in the inter-imperialist conflict for world hegemony. This position presents some possibilities and opportunities for the Kurdish bourgeoisie. They can reorganise on a broader basis of interests and possibly make a new deal with the Turkish bourgeoisie. Alternatively, they could deal with the big regional states, if bigger inducements are presented to them. This would be premised on them operating as an independent Kurdistan. This new position also provides "opportunities" for them to expand into other Kurdistan regions together with Turkey. However, if the conditions exist, they will do this alone, without Turkey. So, PKK is tempted by these "opportunities". The real reasons for the "transformation" that PKK is undergoing can only be explained by this "development". Obviously, no other reasons can be put forward.

If PKK will continue its claimed adherance to popular revolution, it has to orientate towards broader opportunities which have been opened up and widened by the new universally accepted position that Kurdistan has achieved in the last 5-6 years. It must orientate towards the Kurdish people, popular revolution and the united movement of the working class and of the labouring masses against imperialism and reactionary forces. Otherwise, PKK's much vaunted claims are no guarantee of popular revolution, no matter how strongly they may believe in it subjectively, or how broad the sections of the Kurdish people militarised by PKK, or how self-sacrificingly the struggle is conducted. Additionally, the sufferings experienced by the Kurdish people and youth will be wasted and this will aid the reorganisation on a broader level of Kurdish reactionary forces and even probably the Turkish reactionary forces and imperialism to a certain extent.

We say this because PKK's political and organisational work and its understanding of revolution is already paving the way not for the organisation of the Kurdish people but for that of the Kurdish bourgeoisie. It is also broadening the opportunities for a new agreement (against the interests of the peoples of the two nationalities) between the Turkish and Kurdish bourgeoisies. PKK has to understand that further progress in this direction will confront it with the danger of being absorbed by the Kurdish bourgeoisie, being defeated or having to submit.

If PKK reverses its present negative orientation towards the growing revolutionary possibilities in Kurdistan, this will mean that PKK has identified the genuine social and political forces of popular revolution. In that case, it will be inevitable and obligatory for PKK to have a revolutionary platform, revolutionary work and organisation which are similar to our party's political platform on the Kurdish question. Despite itself, PKK will also be forced to consider our party's line and work on the organisation of the Kurdish people in national popular committees (obviously the present town committees of PKK are not the same). They will have to look at the question of winning the leadership of the on-going struggle and the organisation of guerrilla warfare that is linked to the mass struggle. There is no doubt about this.

Under such circumstances, the prospect for an alliance between the Kurdish national movement and the working class movement in Turkey and Kurdistan against imperialism and the reactionary forces from any nationality will certainly be strengthened. In the same way, the working class and popular revolution will have significant opportunities. If we leave aside PKK's general theory on socialism and revolution and its (Lebanon originated) thesis on the revolution in Turkey, these are our party's main criticisms about PKK's actual political and organisational work and its understanding of revolution.

3- As to the other part of your question regarding our party's relation with PKK: Our party has clear criticisms of PKK's increasingly evident orientation towards reformism and parliamentarianism and about the "transformation", which is maturing in PKK, which bring it closer to the Kurdish bourgeoisie. Despite these criticisms, despite its actions that harm the struggle of the people and the contradictory elements in its line, our party considers PKK as an organisation that has a revolutionary role and as the most significant political current with which an alliance should be formed.

In addition, our party believes it is correct to form unions and alliances and to cooperate with PKK. Even though these alliances are not stable and they are not characterised by gradually becoming fronts -because of the reasons we have indicated above- our party and its youth organisations are encouraged to make alliances with PKK organisations on concrete problems. Of all PKK's relatively stable alliances or the ones concerned with daily struggles, the only alliance that is underpinned by a genuine and unconditional support to the Kurdish nation is the cooperation between our party organisations and PKK's on this or that question.

Let us emphasise that the essence of our party's support to the Kurdish nation is not composed only of alliances with PKK. For instance, the joint call published by one of our provincial organisations with a PKK organisation is an example of such cooperation. In addition, joint actions, even though not many, are carried out between our organisations in Turkey and Kurdistan. Our party organisations in various mass organisations confront reactionary pressures of some groups against cooperation with PKK. One of the reasons why attempts for joint actions and cooperation are rare and weaker than we would like is that our organisations are often faced with attacks and have to undergo a great many upheavals, especially in the towns of Kurdistan. It is a fact that there is no obstacle from our party to cooperation with PKK organisations in various fields and actions.

It is also true that there are serious hindrances which originated in PKK's line, work and orientation that we have indicated above which impede the formation of fronts and cooperation to a greater extent between us. Our differences on questions such as the understanding of revolution, the political and organisational platform, the actual tasks and forms of the Kurdish struggle constitute the main obstacle to realising broad fronts between our party and PKK.

For instance, our party believes that the national liberation of the Kurdish people necessitates struggling against imperialism and the Turkish and Kurdish reactionary forces. How then can an alliance be forged when PKK facilitates these forces in the country and abroad becoming allies in solving the Kurdish question? Just to give another example, our party's platform demands the transfer of public enterprises and institutions like education, health, transport, etc. to the Kurdish people. Thus, how is it possible to find common ground with PKK when they are destroying these institutions and establishments? How can we move to an alliance in the form of a front when PKK stands on a platform which has and will continue to subordinate the Kurdish people to the Kurdish bourgeois-feudal circles and ensure they are condemned to a spontaneous (bourgeois) national consciousness exclusively?

In contrast, our party's main task is to assist the democratic and class-based organisation and awakening of the workers and labourers. We aim to expand the Kurdish national awakening to the awakening and liberation of the people and as a result the eradication of the political influence of the Kurdish reformist bourgeoisie over the people.

Finally, our party wants the central parliament and the government to announce that they have no claims over or authority to rule in Kurdistan. We work to educate and mobilise the Turkish and Kurdish people on this question. Similarly, how is a broad alliance possible when PKK adopts the same political platform as the Kurdish and Turkish reformist bourgeois and petit-bourgeois circles which claim that "the solution of the Kurdish question is in parliament"?

Many other questions present themselves. We could mention other points like PKK's understanding of action and armed action or its indiscriminate terror in Turkey and Kurdistan. The bourgeoisie uses this to provoke chauvinism and to consolidate its reactionary propaganda campaign. However, this is not necessary. It is clear that a broader alliance in the form of a front is not possible without having common approaches to such questions.

As a conclusion we can state that the obstacles blocking the formation of broad fronts and cooperation between our party and PKK are very real. The formation of such alliances directly depends on PKK abandoning its present political line and work and orientating towards a genuine popular revolution. Despite all these differences let us emphasize that our party will not abstain from cooperating with every political current and group, especially PKK, in every field and in any circumstances where the interests of the workers, labouring masses and of the Kurdish people can be advanced.

Let us emphasise this too: Our party is aware of the tasks of its organisations in Turkey and Kurdistan, as well as the revolutionary attitude of the working class of both nationalities concerning the Kurdish question. These tasks in Turkey and Kurdistan are different from each other. Yet they are two sides of the same coin. Our party organisations in Turkey consider the question of the national liberation of the Kurdish people as a more vital issue for the working class and the people of the Turkish nation than for the Kurdish people. In order to gain the support of the Kurdish people, our party organisations adopt an attitude which stands resolutely against reactionary offensives. In our party's theory, understanding and practice, the right of the Kurdish people to self-determination is an absolute and unconditional right. One of the tasks that our party attaches great importance to is the struggle against attacks on the Kurdish nation, the exposure of these attacks and the mobilisation of the workers and labourers of the Turkish nation against them. We do this independently of how the Kurdish people chose to use their freedom.

Our party considers PKK as a part of the Kurdish people, irrespective of the differences between us. Whatever crucial weaknesses our criticisms highlight and whatever shortcomings PKK orientations are causing in the struggle of the Kurdish people we maintain this attitude. All our organisations, particularly the ones in Turkey, will continue to struggle against the attacks on PKK, without ever abstaining from critisising it and from the work of enlightening and organising the Kurdish people in Kurdistan. That is our party's relationship to PKK and our attitude towards the attacks on it.

4- "What is the state of your party in Kurdistan?" is the final part of your question about the Kurdish question. Let us start answering this by saying that our party's work is not at the stage that it could/should be. Our organisations in Kurdistan are smaller in comparision with the ones in Turkey. Their development is relatively slow. Undoubtedly, there are some objective and subjective reasons for that.

The first is the characteristics of the present period that we are passing through in the world, in Turkey and in Kurdistan. Briefly, as a result of world developments, national movements, on an international scale, have entered into a period of growth and change of direction that is unprecedented in the history of imperialism. This development had a temporary effect in deepening the illusions of the Kurdish people on the national question. Similarly, as a part of this same phenomenon in Kurdistan, the working class' concern about the national question is, as a class, weak at present. For the working class this is a sign of both being relatively advanced, compared to the other oppressed classes, and at the same time being underdeveloped as a class.

The second reason why our party organisations in Kurdistan are small and developing slowly is that they have shortcomings and have made mistakes. They have difficulty in carrying out the necessary work. Let us emphasise that our party considers it a principle to work among the working class in Kurdistan also. The relative stagnation observed in the open movement of the working class in Kurdistan reflects itself in various ways in the work of our party organisations and in the level of development of their ability to struggle. Also, our organisations have not yet rooted themselves. They are at the very beginning of their development.

Our party organisations, circles and cadres are still in the process of learning how to overcome these particular difficulties and of how to concretely evaluate the conditions of Kurdistan and the opportunities created by these conditions for struggle against the dictatorship. It is true that the following two facts have resulted in some losses and waste of energy: First of all, our party's line of struggle and of organisation demands more talent than those developed by traditional and usual work. Secondly, the tendencies towards right and left deviations experienced in our organisations' work during the previous period have disrupted us. Our organisations experienced a period of vacilitation in learning and implementing the policy of the party. These and other factors have constituted the main problems which have slowed down the development of our organisations. We can not say that these factors have yet been completely eradicated.

However we must underline that this does not tell the whole story about our party's Kurdistan organisation. Opportunities for dynamic development always exist and are becoming more developed today. Our party has chosen big industrial, trade and cultural centres in Kurdistan as its basic areas of work and is struggling on the political platform that we have outlined. Our party has organisations and organisational links, even though not at a level we desire or could achieve, in the main towns of Kurdistan -with the exception of the border towns in the south.

Our organisations have been subjected to the attacks of the dictatorship, have faced ups and downs in their work and even temporary interruptions in some places. These interruptions are gradually decreasing and being replaced by the temporary shrinking of some organisations. Despite this, they are continuing their struggle and trying to educate and organise the masses.

The infrastructure of our Kurdistan organisation is composed of party units and organisational links established among the workers in some workplaces both in the towns where industrial and service workers are concentrated and in some other towns. And also we have links with the student, peasant youth, the youth in further education and in some regions and villages. Although these organisations are not yet in the position of representing the workers and labouring masses in their areas, they are dynamic and have this potential.

Our organisations in Kurdistan have not yet reached the stage of struggle or the ability to wage war which corresponds to our party's line and its policy of guerilla warfare. However, they are defending, by arms and any other means they can, their work of educating, mobilising and organising the masses. They are fulfilling the demands of this work more and more.

In addition, they are moving forward the task of publishing and circulating an illegal mass newspaper whose crucial importance in educating and organising the labouring masses can not be denied. No other parties or groups have succeeded in doing this in Kurdistan. Devrimin Sesi (The Voice of Revolution, the central organ of our party) and Denge Sores'li Kurdistan (The Voice of Revolution in Kurdistan which is published by our Kurdistan Organisation) are produced and distributed illegally by the provincial organisations of our Kurdistan Organisation. These publications normally have a systematic circulation of 6-8 thousand in Kurdistan. Occasionally they have lower circulations (sometimes as low as 1-2 thousand) caused by the repeated attacks on us.

At present, the main problem in our organisation's work reflects itself in our insufficient skill in educating the labourers and youth that are influenced by our agitational work and in organising them in party tasks. Therefore, it is a fact that our Kurdistan Organisation is obviously still in a learning period.

In conclusion, in the period before us, which is, for our party, a period of renewal from top to bottom, our organisations and cadres have the task of learning to weld their activities to the line of the party and of being reshaped as communist organisations of the workers and labourers which have the strength to seize political power.

Our party is aware of the shortcomings of our Kurdistan Organisation and of its tasks concerning the Kurdish question. We have stated our line on the main points. The period before us will be one in which our organisations have to take further steps to steep themselves in the experience of this line and to apply it to real life. Let us emphasise that contrary to the claims of many people, the Kurdish question is not one that has "reached its conclusion". The deepening economic and political crisis in the region is drawing Kurdistan towards harsh conflicts and turmoil more than ever. Moreover, the working class movement has the potential to transform the present trend of the Kurdish question totally. Our Kurdistan Organisation is, essentially, aiming to become the organisation of this period. Clearly, its developmental dynamic shows that it can and will achieve this.